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PREFACE 
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work and keeping me in a good mood. 
The Sampol methods group, Katarina Birkedal and Anne Katrine Mortensen, for valuable 
remarks on various chapters.  
And Joachim, you are the best.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
American vice presidents have become influential and powerful political figures. Yet, they are 
not popularly elected; since 1940, they have been personally selected by the presidential 
nominees themselves. This thesis examines these selections in further detail, seeking to 
identify which characteristics the presidential nominees look for in a running mate. The 
reseach question is the following: Which factors explain the vice presidential selections from 
1940 to 2008?  
  
The theoretical framework for the thesis is a limited one, since the selection of vice presidents 
has yet to attract much scholarly interest. There are, however, three discernable theories in the 
literature. First, there is the ticket-balancing theory, representing the traditional explanation 
on the subject. It expects presidential nominees to select running mates that complement them 
in some way, come from large states and/or have rivalled them for the presidential nomination. 
The theory of increased complexity, on the other hand, claims that these traditional selection 
criteria is only part of the explanation and should be supplemented by a set of modern 
selection criteria. Finally, the theory of changed dynamics contends that traditional selection 
criteria no longer govern the selections. Now, the presidential nominees’ primary concern is 
to select a running mate with political experience.  
 
The three theories are assessed comparatively, through the use of a conditional logistic 
regression. The data is provided by Douglas Kriner and Jody Baumgartner.  
 
The evaluation of the theories indicates that the ticket-balancing theory has less explanatory 
power than the two other theories. Thus, the thesis proposes a synthesis model that combines 
the theory of increased complexity and the theory of changed dynamics. This model shows 
that presidential nominees generally have chosen ambitious running mates that enjoy much 
media coverage, whilst they do not pick running mates that rivalled them for the presidential 
nomination. Also, a difference over time is observable: Prior to 1976, presidential nominees 
tended to pick running mates from populous states, but the same tendency is not existent after 
1972. Lastly, the presidential nominees have probably been conscious of the running mates’ 
genders and ethnic backgrounds: Some have wanted the tickets to be demographically 
balanced, whilst most would not even consider the possibility of such balance. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
The American vice presidency has become an office of major political importance. 
Consequently, the question of how the vice presidents are chosen should be of great current 
interest. Yet, scholarly attention devoted to this subject has been scarce. There is posited but 
three distinct theories on the mechanisms governing the selections of vice presidents. Seeking 
to expand on that theoretical framework, this master thesis tests the three theories statistically. 
Through the comparison of their compliance with empirical data, the thesis aims to answer the 
following question:  
 
Which factors explain the vice presidential selections from 1940 to 2008?  
 
The first of the three theories, the ticket-balancing theory, is the conventional wisdom on the 
subject. Its core postulation is that the vice presidential candidates are chosen because they 
have characteristics that the presidential nominees lack. The theory of increased complexity, 
on the other hand, focuses on the increasingly complex calculus that the presidential nominees 
face in their selection of running mate. It contends that a multitude of modern selection 
criteria have emerged to supplement the traditional ticket-balancing variables.  Finally, the 
theory of changed dynamics claims that reforms of the selection process in the early 1970’s 
have transformed the mechanisms governing the selections. The traditional selection criteria 
are now redundant, rendering political experience as the most crucial asset for a vice president. 
 
These theories are evaluated and compared on the basis of three separate conditional logistic 
regression models. In turn, the results of these analyses lead to the construction of a final 
model combining the most pertinent variables explaining vice presidential selections. 
 
1.1 THE THESIS’ SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTION 
The subject of the American vice presidency is largely understudied. Indicative of this is the 
shortage of academic works that are published. There is merely a handful of book-length 
publications that focus on the vice presidency (for example Goldstein 1982; Baumgartner 
2006; Walch 1997; Kengor 2000b), and the many textbooks on the American presidency 
typically devote just a couple of pages to the second office. Accordingly, the specific topic of 
vice presidential selection has virtually been ignored. Only a few studies have been conducted 
on the subject, and they have analyzed different datasets, emphasized different variables and 
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presented diverging results (Hiller and Kriner 2008; Sigelman and Wahlbeck 1997; 
Baumgartner 2008). Thus, the thesis will represent a valuable contribution to the literature, 
both by filling an apparent void in the literature and by contributing to the limited existent 
theoretical framework.  
 
1.2 TOPICAL RELEVANCE 
Not only does the topic of vice presidential selection represent an unexplored territory for 
political scientists, it is also a matter of central political importance. Four arguments 
substantiate that claim.  
 
First, the selection of the vice president is the first significant decision that a presidential 
nominee makes. It thus provides a unique opportunity for the candidate to command the 
nation’s attention on his own terms, shape the campaign dynamic to his advantage and give a 
first impression of his style of government (Berke 2004). Illustratively, George W. Bush 
described the choice of running mate as a “tell-all” judgment about the presidential nominee 
(Berggren 2001).   
  
Second, the selection of the vice president is often assumed to have an impact on the result of 
the general election. This assumption applies particularly to the so-called bad choices; 
selecting the wrong person for the job may be hurtful for the presidential nominee (Goldstein 
1982; Adkison 1982). Most recently, such allegations were directed towards John McCain’s 
running mate in 2008, Sarah Palin. Both political commentators (CNN 2008; Bergthold 2008; 
Carney and Scherer 2008) and empirical studies (Ulbig 2009; Brox and Cassels 2009; Heflick 
and Goldenberg 2009) have placed more or less of the blame for McCain’s loss in the 
presidential campaign on her.  
 
Third, a selection of a vice president is effectively a selection of a potential president. In case 
of presidential resignation, death or disability, the vice presidency will provide the successor 
for the nation’s highest post. Also, the office has a certain political springboard effect. Since 
1945, most vice presidents have subsequently pursued the presidency themselves and five of 
them have proceeded to become presidents in their own rights (Natoli 1988b), Thus, one can 
argue that the office has become “the surest route to a presidential nomination” (Hurwitz 1980: 
509). 
 
 3 
Finally, the vice presidency has emerged as a political power base of its own. One need only 
look to the tenure of vice president Dick Cheney for illustration: The concept of “vice 
presidential power” is no longer an oxymoron (Azari 2006; Light 1984). The investigation of 
the selection of the office-holders must therefore be considered an important venture, as the 
political ramifications of the vice presidential choice can possibly be crucial. 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
The vice presidency is not an institution familiar to all. Therefore, chapter two of the thesis 
discusses the historical development of both the office and the selection process. Thereafter, 
chapter three establishes the thesis’ theoretical framework, by introducing and comparing the 
three relevant theories. Chapter four follows by presenting the conditional logistic regression 
model, whilst chapter five focuses on the data material for the thesis. The analysis is thus 
conducted in chapter six. Finally, the findings are summarized and concluded upon in chapter 
seven.  
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2 FROM IRRELEVANCE TO SIGNIFICANCE 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the historical development of the vice presidency, 
from an office of virtually no importance to a post of great political powers. Also, it discusses 
the most important transformations of the vice presidential selection process. 
 
2.1 THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTION 
The vice presidency’s constitutional mandate is a weak one. In fact, the Framers of the 
Constitution created the office as an afterthought: It was seen not as a necessity of its own, but 
as a means to perfecting the governmental system they already had imagined (Albert 2005). 
Thus, they assigned it with only two specific functions. Most important was the successor role: 
In case of presidential vacancy, the vice president would take over. Yet, the nature and 
durance of such a succession was left unspecified in the Constitution. That was a latent source 
of confusion until 1841, when John Tyler became the first successor president. He set the 
precedence by both assuming full powers and staying in office for the remainder of the 
presidential term (Felzenberg 2001). Since then, nine vice presidents have served as successor 
presidents1.  
 
The other task rendered the vice president in the Constitution was to preside over the Senate, 
casting tie-breaking votes. However, this did not give the office significant powers. On the 
contrary, as vice presidents were placed in a hybrid position between legislative and executive, 
it could rather be regarded as an obstacle. Both Congress and the presidential administration 
would tend to regard the vice presidents with some suspicion, as they were not fully a part of 
either branch of government (Milkis and Nelson 2008). Illustratively, it was even argued that 
the Constitution prevented the vice president from increasing its powers. The reasoning was 
that presidential delegation of tasks or functions to the vice president would be inconsistent 
with the principles of separation of powers, as the vice president was presiding officer of the 
Senate (Goldstein 1982).  
 
To complicate matters more, the Framers also provided for a peculiar selection process of the 
vice presidents. Aiming at the most qualified man for the job, they decided that the person 
                                                 
1
 The nine other successor presidents were Millard Fillmore (1850), Andrew Johnson (1865), Chester A. Arthur 
(1881), Theodore Roosevelt (1901), Calvin Coolidge (1923), Harry Truman (1945), Lyndon B. Johnson (1963) 
and Gerald Ford (1974) (Milkis and Nelson 2008: 500-501). 
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with the second most votes in the Electoral College should be afforded the title. Because this 
effectively meant that the president’s principal opponent in the election became his vice 
president, it opened for animosity and rivalry between the two office-holders. That was the 
case between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in 1796 and later between Thomas Jefferson 
and Aaron Burr in 1800. The relationship between the latter pair was especially difficult, as 
Jefferson had only marginally won after an initial tie between them. Thus, in order to exclude 
his opponent from government, Jefferson called for the Twelfth Amendment. This was 
enacted in 1804 and provided that presidential and vice presidential candidates ran together as 
a ticket, and that electors would cast votes for each office separately (House 2008). 
 
2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL POWER  
As a consequence of the vice presidency’s feeble Constitutional basis, it enjoyed low status 
from the beginning. Derogatory remarks about the office’s irrelevance were rampant, and 
frequently posited by the office-holders themselves. Illustratively, the first vice president John 
Adams referred to his position as “the most insignificant office that ever the intention of man 
contrived or his imagination conceived” (Kincade 2000: 3).   
 
The Twelfth Amendment did not ameliorate the situation. It entailed that the vice presidential 
candidate was chosen by party leaders, and these leaders seldom took the opinion of the 
presidential nominee into account. Rather, they aimed to please the factions of the party that 
were least content with the nomination. Thus, they selected running mates that were starkly 
different than the presidential nominee, for example in terms of ideological perspective, 
regional belonging and/or religious denomination. This strategy of ticket-balancing did not 
foster a friendly relationship between the ticket-holders. Consequently, once the presidents 
were in office, they were generally reluctant to include their vice presidents in governmental 
affairs (Milkis and Nelson 2008: 455). 
 
However, at the start of the twentieth century, the vice presidency’s political status was 
boosted. This was partly due to the rise of mass media and a new style of presidential 
campaigning. Starting with Theodore Roosevelt in the election of 1900, the vice president 
campaigned actively for the presidential ticket. Through travels and media-transmitted 
speeches, the public profile of the vice presidency was raised. In turn, this attracted 
increasingly able politicians to the office. Prominent figures such as Nobel Prize laureate 
Charles Dawes and Senate majority leader Charles Curtis took the office in the 1920’s. Yet, 
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these office-holders generally did not gain substantial influence. It was not until the late 
1930’s’s that the real growth in political powers began (Williams 1956).  
 
2.2.1 Mid-century acceleration - the bomb 
The New Deal politics of Franklin D. Roosevelt and World War II lead the governmental 
duties to grow enormously, both in number and complexity. Inevitably, that required an 
enlargement of the presidential administration. The creation of the Executive Office of the 
President in 1939 was a milestone in that respect, streamlining the presidential bureaucracy 
and increasing the organizational apparatus. This expansion of government affected the vice 
presidents; it pulled them closer into the presidential orbit (Baumgartner 2006; Kengor 2000a).  
 
Roosevelt’s vice president, John Nance Garner, was initially very influential, acting both as 
Roosevelt’s advisor and his liaison to Congress (Williams 1956). However, the relationship 
between the two soured in Roosevelt’s second term, illustrated by Garner’s referral to his 
position as “not worth a pitcher of warm piss” (Baumgartner 2006: 3)2. Thus, Roosevelt 
replaced Garner with Henry Wallace in 1940. Wallace continued the tradition of counseling 
the president, but his involvement in Congress was more ceremonial than substantial. This 
reflects another trend in vice presidential development: Whilst influence in government has 
expanded, participation in the legislative branch has decreased.  
 
The tenures of Garner and Wallace both represented advances of vice presidential power and 
influence. The ensuing vice presidency of Harry Truman would be a setback in that 
development. Roosevelt’s third vice president was kept largely in the dark on important 
government issues. He is reported to have been largely ignorant of the existence of the atomic 
bomb when Roosevelt died in 1945 (Milkis and Nelson 2008; Natoli 1988a). As a result of 
this scandalous situation, later presidents have to an increasing extent sought to ensure that 
their vice presidents would never come into power as ill-prepared as Truman was. They 
involved the vice presidents more in foreign and domestic policy issues, gave them a seat in 
the National Security Council and drafted the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The latter incident 
was especially important: The amendment clarified the conditions of vice presidential 
succession to the presidency and provided that a new vice president should be appointed if the 
office became vacant (Felzenberg 2001; Natoli 1982).  
                                                 
2
 Notably, this comment was made 20 years after Garner had been vice president. 
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One of the authors of the amendment, Richard Nixon, was also one of the vice presidents that 
used the office as a springboard to the presidency. However, not only was his presidential 
tenure cut short by the Watergate-affair, his vice president Spiro Agnew was too struck by a 
scandal. Agnew was charged with corruption, extortion and tax fraud and had to resign in 
1973. His replacement for the vice presidency was Gerald Ford, who in turn became president 
when Nixon stepped down in 1974. As president, Ford selected Nelson Rockefeller as his 
second officer, but replaced Rockefeller with Bob Dole in his bid for re-election in 1976. 
Thus, Ford became the last president to ever swap out his running mate: All subsequent 
presidents have run for re-election with the same running mate as in the first term 
(Sirgiovanni 1994). 
 
2.2.2 Institutionalisation of the modern vice presidency 
It is the presidency of Jimmy Carter that is generally attributed the institutionalisation of the 
modern vice presidency (Goldstein 2008: 377). The moderate southern governor chose the 
northern liberal Walter Mondale, with two terms of experience in the Senate, for the office. 
Mondale became the first vice president to have an ongoing, central role in the government, as 
Carter relied on him for advice on all aspects. He was given an office in the West Wing, 
increased staff, regular meetings with the president and unfettered access to important 
information and meetings (Natoli 1977). Thus, he rendered his successors with an entirely 
new set of resources to draw upon.  
 
Subsequent vice presidents have all taken advantage of these resources, but neither George H. 
W. Bush nor Dan Quayle was as influential as Mondale. In that respect, the “Double Bubba” 
ticket of the young moderate Southerners Bill Clinton and Al Gore became the first to carry 
on the Mondale legacy. Gore took a pivotal role in the government, both as Clinton’s advisor 
and as the principal decision-maker on certain policy areas (Berke 1998; Goldstein 2008). 
  
Still, in terms of political influence, Gore is surpassed by his successor Dick Cheney. Cheney 
served a multitude of governmental functions, but his most important role was being George 
Bush jr’s closest confidant and advisor. Through this position, he is thought to have 
influenced the president to an unprecedented extent. Commentators and political insiders 
frequently attribute him an immense part of the responsibility of the government’s actions, 
especially on economy and security issues (Gellmann and Becker 2007; Subhawong 2008). 
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Indeed, Cheney’s extraordinary political authority have earned his two-term tenure 
classifications such as “the imperial vice presidency” (Blumenthal 2007).  
 
Though only having served months in office, current vice president Joseph Biden already is 
an influential figure in the administration. Apparently, this was assured in advance: Before 
accepting the vice presidential nod, Biden was guaranteed that his post would not be 
ceremonial, but that he would have substantial responsibilities. Still, his role is considerably 
different from those of his immediate predecessors. Whilst Gore had responsibility of discrete 
political areas and Cheney was his own power centre, Biden is more of an interdisciplinary 
advisor and trouble-shooter, and is involved in every aspect of government (Leibovich 2009).  
 
2.3 THE CHANGES IN THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION PROCESS 
Three significant transformations of the vice presidential selection process can be identified. 
The first of these concerns the decisional power. Since the introduction of the Twelfth 
Amendment, local party bosses had selected the vice presidential candidate. However, in 1940, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt bucked the party leaders by making his own candidacy contingent upon 
the nomination of Henry A. Wallace. That marked the start of what is referred to as the 
“modern era” of vice presidential selection, characterized by the presidential candidate’s 
personal selection of his running mate (Jones 1994: 94). Only in 1956, when Adlai Stevenson 
deferred the choice of running mate to the convention, have party leaders since had any 
formal role in the decision-making3. 
 
The second change of the vice presidential selection process occurred in 1972. The 
Democratic Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, informally known as the 
McGovern-Fraser Commission, issued several institutional reforms on the presidential 
nomination process. As a response, most states went from selecting the convention delegates 
in closed party councils to electing them in direct primaries. This provided that the 
presidential candidates normally knew that they would receive the nomination at an earlier 
point in time than before. Therefore, they were given more time to select the vice president. 
The reforms also effectively applied to the Republican Party, as many of the states codified 
them in their laws (Milkis and Nelson 2008). 
                                                 
3
 Notably, because of Stevenson’s actions in 1956, Baumgartner (2006) identifies the following election year, 
1960, as the start of the modern era of vice presidential selection. The norm is, however, to treat 1940 as the 
demarcation line between traditional and modern selections. 
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A third and related transformation occurred in 1976. Until then, vice presidential selections 
had typically been the results of hasty decisions. This is exemplified by George McGovern’s 
selection of Thomas Eagleton in 1972, made in a marathon session that left no time to 
investigate Eagleton’s past. Days later, it was revealed that he had undergone electroshock 
treatment for depression and fatigue. Though Eagleton was pressured into resigning, the affair 
became a liability for McGovern, who eventually lost the presidential election (Strout 1995). 
In 1976, however, Carter introduced a particularly meticulous selection process. His aides 
initially constructed a list of 400 names. That list was in turn narrowed down to include 
fourteen potential candidates, whose strengths and weaknesses were tested by a pollster4. The 
seven that made the eventual shortlist were interviewed and asked to submit personal 
information to the vetting team, before Carter finally settled on Mondale (Goldstein 1982; 
Light 1984). This form of vetting process has since become the norm for vice presidential 
selection5. 
 
2.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The history of the vice presidency is a tale of transformation. From being an office of virtually 
no political relevance, it has developed into a post of central political importance. As a natural 
consequence, the selection of the vice presidents has too gained currency as a salient issue for 
politicians. Since 1940, presidential nominees have asserted their right to select their running 
mates themselves instead of leaving the choice to party leaders. Also, they have to an 
escalating extent put their energy in the search for the right candidate, as demonstrated by the 
vetting processes becoming both longer and more intense.  
                                                 
4
 Polls has admittedly been used earlier, for example by Johnson in 1964 and Nixon in 1968, yet it was never 
before used as part of such a thorough vetting procedure as in 1976 (Adkison 1982). 
5
 Albeit with the exceptions of Gerald Ford’s choice of Robert Dole in 1976 and Ronald Reagan’s choice of 
George H. W. Bush, which were both last-minute choices (Baumgartner 2006: 63).  
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3 THREE COMPETING THEORIES OF VICE 
PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION 
 
As seen in the preceding chapter, the vice presidency has risen in importance. However, the 
scholarly interest in the office has not seen a parallel growth. Academic literature on the 
subject is still very limited in scope; the few lengthier publications that do exist are often 
descriptive and written primarily to convince the readers that the office is not irrelevant6. 
Inevitably, that renders the thesis with a relatively narrow theoretical framework. There are, 
however, three theories that are posited to explain the selection of the vice presidents.  
 
For reasons of brevity, the theories have all been designated with names pertaining to their 
theoretical core. The first theory is the ticket-balancing theory. It represents the conventional 
wisdom on the vice presidential selection and was tested by Siegelman and Wahlbeck in the 
first rigorous empirical study of the subject in 1997. The theory of increased complexity is 
derived from Jody Baumgartner’s development of a prediction model for Obama’s choice of 
running mate. It was therefore published over a decade later, the same year as Mark Hiller and 
Douglas Kriner’s theory of changed dynamics was posited, in 2008. As such, the latter two 
theories can both be viewed as modified versions of the original ticket-balancing theory. 
 
This chapter is devoted to the introduction and comparison of these three theories. The 
comparison is based on the theories’ contents, their structural properties and the scientific 
context in which they were posited. The table below indicates the fundamental elements in the 
comparison between the three theories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The most recent example is Jody Baumgartner’s book The American Vice Presidency Reconsidered. In the 
preface, the author writes that the “purpose of the book is to rescue the vice presidency from the overwhelmingly 
negative impression people have of the office and its occupants” (2006: 3) 
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Table 3.1 Theory comparison  
 
The ticket-balancing 
theory 
Theory of increased 
complexity 
Theory of changed 
dynamics 
THEORETICAL 
POSTULATIONS 
 
Dependent variable First choice Actual nominee First choice 
Unit of analysis Shortlist finalists Shortlist finalists Shortlist finalists 
Explanatory variables Traditional Modern and traditional Modern or traditional 
Temporal change None Incremental Threshold (1972/1976) 
Selection incentives Electoral, party appeasement Electoral Electoral, governance 
THEORETICAL 
PROPERTIES 
 
Complexity/parsimony Parsimonious Complex Parsimonious 
Actor/ institution Actor-centred Actor-centred Institutional 
BACKGROUND OF 
THE THEORIES 
 
Research goal Explain Predict Explain 
Empirical track record Poor Good Good 
 
 
3.1 THEORETICAL POSTULATIONS 
The theories offer fundamentally different explanations of the vice presidential selections. Yet, 
since both the theory of increased complexity and the theory of changed dynamics are built on 
the basic assumptions of the ticket-balancing theory, they also share certain commonalities. 
The key differences and similarities are summarized below in the five following categories: 
Dependent variable, unit of analysis, selection incentives, explanatory variables and temporal 
change. 
 
3.1.1 Dependent variable 
The theories all aim to explain the same thing: The presidential nominees’ personal selections 
of the vice presidential candidates. Yet, they operate with slightly different dependent 
variables. The ticket-balancing theory and the theory of changed dynamics both aim to 
identify the politicians that were firstly asked to serve as vice presidential candidates. Whether 
the respective politicians actually accepted these offers is considered irrelevant. The third 
theory, the theory of increased complexity, takes a different approach: Its dependent variable  
is the actual vice presidential nominee.  
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However, this does not necessarily place the theory in an entirely different category than the 
other two theories. Hiller and Kriner (2008: 410) state this clearly: “There is considerable 
evidence that the dynamics underlying the selection of the first-choice running mate also 
characterize the selection process of the eventual nominee”. This thesis builds on this claim, 
arguing that despite the theories’ different understandings of the dependent variables, they are 
fundamentally comparable.  
 
3.1.2 Units of analysis 
When the presidential nominee starts searching for his running mate, he draws from an almost 
unlimited amount of politicians that might be considered for the job. For instance, as 
commented upon in chapter 2, Jimmy Carter started his search with a list of 400 names. Yet, 
at some point in the vetting process, the original list is condensed to include the candidates 
that are viewed as most promising. The candidates on this ultimate shortlist constitute the pool 
from which the presidential nominee selects the eventual running mate. These are referred to 
as the vice presidential finalists and are the units of analysis of all the three theories. 
  
3.1.3 Explanatory variables 
So what makes the presidential nominee prefer one shortlisted candidate over the others? The 
theories all postulate that the choice is based on the characteristics of the alternatives. These 
characteristics constitute the explanatory variables of the vice presidential selection.  
 
Traditional ticket-balancing variables 
The ticket-balancing theory represents the “conventional wisdom” on the subject. Thus, the 
variables pertaining to the theory are labeled traditional. An overview of the variables, as well 
as an illustration of the causal relationship is presented in the figure below. 
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Figure 3.1 The traditional variables of the ticket-balancing theory 
 
As the name of the theory indicates, the bulk of the variables revolves around a balanced 
ticket. These variables expect a running mate to complement the presidential nominee, by 
bringing qualities to the ticket that the nominee lacks. The characteristics of the vice 
presidential candidates are thus practically irrelevant in themselves, but valuable if they are 
opposite to those of the presidential nominee.  
 
The theory envisages six ways that the vice presidential candidate can balance the ticket.  
First, the ticket can have regional balance.  This means that the presidential candidate picks a 
running mate from a different geographical region. An example of a believer in this strategy is 
President Carter, as he reportedly refused to even consider running mates that hailed from the 
same part of the country as himself (Rosenstone 1983)7.  
 
Second, there is religious balance. This has generally translated into a Protestant presidential 
candidate choosing a Roman Catholic running mate, and, to a lesser extent, the opposite. In 
the period between 1964 and 1996, almost one-third of the major party tickets was of a 
Protestant-Catholic composition (Berggren 2001). Historically, other Christian denominations 
have also been represented, but there has only been one non-Christian vice presidential 
                                                 
7
 The notion of geographical balance is also present in the Constitution, as the Twelfth Amendment actually 
prohibits electors from voting for both a presidential and vice presidential candidate from the same state as 
themselves. However, this particular provision does not pose a real limitation to the selection of a vice president. 
For example, Dick Cheney lived in George W. Bush’s home state Texas, but relocated to Wyoming before 
accepting the vice presidential nomination. 
Presidential rivalry 
Size of state 
Regional balance 
Religious balance 
Ideological balance 
Demographical balance 
Balance of age 
Balance of political experience 
BALANCING VARIABLES 
OTHER TRADITIONAL VARIABLES 
SHORTLIST OF 
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nominee: In 2000, Democrat Joe Lieberman became the first Jewish candidate to appear on a 
major party ticket (Boxleitner 2008: 33). 
 
Third, the ideological balance variable builds on the assumption that presidential nominee 
selects a vice presidential candidate from an opposing ideological faction of the party. The 
Democratic ticket of 1988 is an example of this strategy. Going to the polls in an intensely 
Reaganite atmosphere, the Republican presidential candidate George H. W. Bush enjoyed 
great support from conservative voters. In an attempt to capture some of Bush’s electoral base, 
the Democrat’s liberal presidential nominee, George Dukakis, opted for the conservative 
Lloyd Bentsen as running mate (Toner 1988).  
 
Fourth, there is the demographical balance variable. This tactic is not as firmly established as 
other balancing strategies. Both gender stereotypes and racial prejudice has been found to 
influence American elections strongly and selecting a female candidate or a candidate from a 
racial/ethnic minority has occasionally been considered an electoral hazard (Sigelman and 
Wahlbeck 1997; Lawless 2004; Kinder and Sanders 1996). That is not to say that the strategy 
has not been followed, tickets have been demographically balanced on three occasions. In 
1984, Walter Mondale picked Geraldine Ferraro, reportedly because he wanted to exploit a 
gender gap in the electorate and because he sought to rival his presidential contender Gary 
Hart’s guarantee of picking a minority running mate. (Baumgartner 2006: 74; Bonk 1988). In 
addition, both tickets in the 2008 presidential campaign were demographically balanced. The 
Democratic ticket was the first to include a black presidential nominee and, according to the 
campaign manager of John McCain, Sarah Palin was chosen largely to appeal to the large 
number of women that originally had supported the presidential candidacy of Hillary Clinton 
(Brox and Cassels 2009).  
 
Fifth, the age balance variable entails that presidential nominees pick running mates of 
different age cohorts than themselves. This may take the form of a young presidential 
candidate selecting an older running mate or vice versa. For example, on the Republican 
ticket of 1988, George H. W. Bush was 23 years older than Dan Quayle. This age difference 
was explicitly used in the campaign: Bush himself commented on his choice of Quayle as a 
“statement of confidence in a younger generation” (Boyd 1988).  
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Finally, the ticket can be balanced in terms of political experience. Again, the Carter-Mondale 
ticket may serve as an example. Carter’s background as a governor was deliberately balanced 
by Mondale’s weighty experience from the Senate: 
 
I considered it vital to choose a member from Congress as my running mate in order to provide some 
balance of experience to the ticket. Without ever having served in Washington myself, I needed 
someone who was familiar with the federal government and particularly with the legislative branch. 
(Carter 1982: 35) 
 
Such balance may also be achieved in the opposite manner. It is generally argued that 
presidential candidates with extensive legislative experience have more leeway to select a 
Washington outsider than presidential candidates that were outsiders themselves. Thus, the 
choice of Palin in 2008 matches the ticket-balancing theory on this variable. Despite her 
limited political experience, which according to presidential scholar Joel K. Goldstein was 
“not consistent with the normal criteria for determining who’s of presidential calibre” 
(Barbash and Mark 2008), her position as governor balanced McCain’s long-term experience 
in the Senate. 
 
Lastly, the theory also incorporates two selection variables that do not intuitively fit under the 
ticket-balancing umbrella, but that nevertheless are parts of the conventional wisdom on vice 
presidential selections. First, there is rivalry for the presidential position. The argument is that 
presidential nominees tend to look among his defeated competitors for the presidential 
nomination, thereby offering them a consolation prize in the form of the vice presidency 
(Jones 1994). The Democratic ticket of 2004 can be considered an example of this strategy, as 
John Kerry paired up with his former rival for the presidential nomination, John Edwards.  
 
The second of the non-balancing variables deals with the size of the vice president’s home 
state. The presidential nominee is expected to pick a running mate from a state with many 
electoral votes, hoping that the running mate would carry the state for the ticket. Though the 
real effect of this “home state advantage” repeatedly is found to be little or even non-existent 
(Romero 2001; Dudley and Rapoport 1989; Tubbesing 1973), the presidential candidate’s 
belief in its impact may still influence the selection. By this logic, John F. Kennedy’s may 
have selected Lyndon B. Johnson because he hailed from Texas. In 1960, Texas was the state 
with the third most electoral votes in the US, and political commentators have frequently 
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speculated that it was in fact Johnson that made Kennedy win the state (for example Purdum 
2004). 
 
The theory of increased complexity: Mix of modern and traditional variables 
The theory of increased complexity builds upon the ticket-balancing theory. It includes many 
of the traditional variables, yet introduces a variety of modern selection criteria as well. An 
overview of the variables of the theory is presented below. 
 
Figure 3.2 Variables of the theory of increased complexity 
 
 
As seen in this figure, the theory includes seven out of the eight traditional variables that were 
part of the ticket-balancing theory. It opens for the possibility that presidential candidates will 
choose running mates that balance the tickets, were rivals for the presidential nomination 
and/or come from populous states. The only traditional variable that is not incorporated in the 
theory is balance of age8.  
                                                 
8
 Baumgartner (2008) includes variables that measure balance of region, demography, ideology and political 
experience in the analysis, but not any variables that measure balance of age. Thus, though the exclusion of the 
variable is never explicitly elaborated on, the thesis assumes that age balance is not considered vital for 
explaining the selections in the theory of increased complexity. However, the age aspect is included in the final 
of the variables, youth. 
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Political experience 
Ambition 
Media exposure 
Military service 
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Demographical balance 
Balance of political experience 
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Yet, in addition to the traditional variables, the theory introduces seven additional variables. 
The argument is that along with the growth of vice presidential responsibilities, the selection 
process has become an increasingly complex affair. It does no longer revolve solely around 
balanced tickets and state size, but also around a set of modern selection criteria. First, there is 
state competitiveness, resting on the claim that presidential candidates will select running 
mates from a state where both parties have an actual chance of winning. If the presidential 
race is close in the state, the hope is thus that the vice president would be the decisive factor 
tipping the electoral in favor of the ticket.  
 
Second, the theory postulates that the presidential nominees choose politicians that have 
weighty political experience. Third, they must have political ambition. Politicians that have 
sought high-ranking political offices in the past (regardless of whether they was afforded the 
position), signal that they are ambitious. Consequently, the presidential nominee can expect 
them to have an interest in the vice presidency, which will increase their chances of being 
selectd.  
 
Fourth, media exposure may provide the vice presidential candidate with an element of name 
recognition that can enhance the electoral appeal of the ticket. Also, as the media plays an 
important role in scrutinizing politicians, it could be regarded as a supplement to the 
presidential nominee’s own vetting process. If a politician has enjoyed much media attention 
without revelations of closet skeletons, the presidential candidate would be inclined to select 
him. Accordingly, in the vice presidential selections of 2008, the Democratic choice was more 
in line with the theory than the Republican choice, as Joe Biden had spent more time in the 
national limelight than his Republican counterpart. A poll conducted immediately after the 
Republican convention illustrates this, as Sarah Palin enjoyed a substantially lower degree of 
name recognition than Biden did (Newport 2008).  
 
Fifth, the theory postulates that politicians with a record of military service are likely to be 
selected as vice presidents. Arguably, military experience could be viewed as an important 
preparation for the role as commander-in-chief. Also, such experience has historically been an 
electoral advantage for an aspirant to practically every political office, leading many post-
World War II politicians to polish their resumes with military service (Baumgartner 2006: 41).  
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Finally, the theory’s remaining two variables suggest that presidential candidates will be 
inclined to choose running mates that add high education and/or youth to the ticket.    
 
The theory of changed dynamics: Modern or traditional variables 
The variables of the theory of changed dynamics are also dividable in the dichotomy of 
traditional and modern. However, unlike the theory of increased complexity, the separation 
between the traditional and modern is absolute: The traditional variables determined the 
earlier vice presidential selections, whilst contemporary selections are determined by a single 
modern variable.  
 
Figure 3.3 Variables of the theory of changed dynamics 
 
 
The figure shows that there are two traditional variables and one modern selection criterion 
that are attributed particular importance by the theory. The logic is that in previous selections, 
the vice presidential candidates’ geographical base was the important matter. The tickets 
should be balanced regionally and the home state of the finalist should have many electoral 
votes. In contrast, recent selections are not at all governed by these traditional selection 
criteria. Rather, the presidential nominees seek competent co-workers that have lengthy 
experience in politics. As such, the pairing of Bill Clinton and Al Gore in 1996 can serve as 
an example of the modern selection dynamics. Gore resembled Clinton on most variables and 
added little balance to the ticket, but he had vast political experience, having served a total of 
24 years in Congress prior to his tenure as vice president. 
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3.1.4 Temporal change 
The discussion of the relevant explanatory variables shows that the theories have different 
perspectives of change over time. The ticket-balancing theory expects the dynamics of the 
vice presidential selections to be largely unchanged from 1940 to 2008, whilst the two other 
theories both contend that the mechanisms behind vice presidential selections have 
transformed during this period.  
 
First, the theory of increased complexity envisages the selection process to have developed 
incrementally throughout the twentieth century. The modern selection criteria have gradually 
emerged to supplement the traditional variables, and the presidential nominees have had to 
consider an increasing number of factors when selecting the running mates. That has logically 
led the traditional criteria to decrease in importance during the period of 1940-2008 
(Baumgartner 2008: 765). 
 
In contrast, the theory of changed dynamics presents a specific threshold for the change in the 
mechanisms of selection. According to the theory, the shift from traditional to modern was 
caused by two confluent events: McGovern’s selection of Thomas Eagleton and the 
McGovern-Frazer reform, both occurring in 19729.  First, the Eagleton affair demonstrated the 
potential damage the selection of a wrong running mate could do to a presidential campaign 
and thus signaled the need for a thorough vetting process. The possibility to conduct such a 
vetting process was in turn provided by the second event: The institutional reforms on the 
presidential nomination process that caused the move from party caucuses to primaries. That 
made the presidential candidate certain of his status as a nominee at an earlier point in his 
election campaign. Thereby he was given more time to interview potential running mates. 
Also, by transferring the locus of power from the party leaders to the electorate, the reforms 
gave rise to more candidate-centered politics. The incentive for pleasing the different party 
leaders/factions thus diminished and the presidential candidate was freer to make the decision 
on his own terms (Hiller and Kriner 2008)10.  
 
                                                 
9
 These events are both discussed in further detail in chapter 2, section 2.3. 
10
 By the same token, the theory of changed dynamics offers an explanation for the increasing power of the vice 
presidency: As running mates are selected on their own merits, and not as a means to achieve party unity, the 
presidents will generally have more confidence in them and be more willing to entrust them with responsibility 
(Hiller and Kriner 2008).  
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3.1.5 Selection incentives 
As already thoroughly stated, presidential nominees make the selection of running mate based 
on his or her characteristics. But why are these characteristics important; what is the ultimate 
goal of the selection? Scholars agree that presidential nominees must balance two 
fundamental objectives when choosing the running mate. First, there is the governance 
criterion. A vice president should have the capacity to govern the country, in case he succeeds 
to the presidency. Second, there is the electoral criterion. The choice of running mate should 
broaden the presidential nominee’s appeal in the general election and maximize the ticket’s 
chance of victory (Grofman 1995).  
 
Obviously, these two criteria have the potential to be conflicting. In the event of such a 
conflict, however, there is consensus in the literature that the latter criteria would be the 
prevailing one (Hiller and Kriner 2008; Polsby et al. 2008; Goldstein 1982; Tubbesing 1973). 
Following this, all three theories present the presidential candidates’ primary rationale for 
selecting vice presidents as electoral. Certain variances are nevertheless detectable: In 
particular, the ticket-balancing theory and the theory of changed dynamics both include 
supplementary perspectives.  
 
The ticket-balancing theory incorporates an element of party appeasement. This has obvious 
historical roots. In the period between the enactment of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804 and 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s personal selection in 1940, party leaders balanced the ticket primarily 
to maintain party unity (Adkison 1982). The ticket-balancing theory extends some of that 
logic to modern vice presidential selection as well. Although presidential candidates will 
balance the ticket mainly to broaden its electoral appeal, they also aim to increase the chance 
of the various party factions’ approval of the ticket.   
 
The theory of changed dynamics is in partial agreement with the ticket-balancing theory, by 
stating that the incentive of party appeasement was important in the selections before 1976. 
However, after 1972, it contends that the selections are more oriented towards the governance 
criterion: The primary motive is that the vice president is capable to serve as president. Still, 
that does not mean that the theory places the governance criterion above the electoral criterion. 
Rather, it supports Michael Nelson’s argument that governance and electoral criteria has been 
brought into more conformity in recent elections. 
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… most presidential nominees realize that voters now care more about the presidential competence and 
loyalty – the ability to succeed the presidency ably and to carry on the departed president’s policy 
faithfully – than they do about having all religious faiths or party factions on the ticket. 
(Nelson 1988: 862) 
 
3.2 THEORETICAL PROPERTIES 
The theories differ not only in terms of their substantive content, but also with regards to more 
structural characteristics. The most striking differences between the theories in this regard 
revolve around parsimony and institutional focus. 
 
3.2.1 Complexity/parsimony 
Two of the theories offer relatively clear-cut arguments of the dynamics behind vice 
presidential selections. The ticket-balancing theory includes a set of eight traditional variables 
of which most are characterized by the same logic of ticket-balancing, and the theory of 
changed dynamics incorporates only three different explanatory variables. This results in 
theoretical parsimony on the part of those two theories. In contrast, the theory of increased 
complexity is a far-from-parsimonious theoretical explanation. Though the variables are 
dichotomously organized in the categories of traditional and modern, the large number of 
them (fourteen in total) still prohibits any uncomplicated summaries of the theoretical core.  
 
3.2.2 Actor/institution 
The theory of changed dynamics portrays the cause for the transformation of the vice 
presidential selection process as a combination of two events, one actor-driven and one 
institutional. However, in a comparison, the actor-driven event (the selection of Eagleton) 
should arguably be considered subordinate. Though the Eagleton affair demonstrated the 
importance of a background check of the candidates, such a check would not have been made 
possible without an alteration of the institutional framework. It was the McGovern-Frazer 
reform that gave the presidential nominees more time to search for a running mate and more 
confidence to select a candidate without necessarily pleasing disgruntled party factions. Thus, 
the theory of changed dynamics can be seen as having an institutional focus. In contrast, the 
ticket-balancing theory is clearly actor-centered: If the presidential candidates’ choices are 
constrained, it is by other actors within the party rather than institutional forces. Likewise, the 
theory of increased complexity does not include specific references to the institutional 
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framework. Its portrayal of the vice presidential selection process can thus be seen as 
primarily actor-driven. 
 
3.3 BACKGROUND OF THE THEORIES 
The three theories are drawn from different backgrounds. The most notable difference is 
perhaps that the ticket-balancing theory represents the conventional take on the vice 
presidential selections, whilst the two other theories build on its theoretical assumptions. Thus, 
the theory of increased complexity and the theory of changed dynamics can be considered 
modified versions of the ticket-balancing theory. Yet, this is not the only divergence between 
the theories’ backgrounds: They were posited with dissimilar research goals and their 
performances in previous empirical tests have been different. 
 
3.3.1 Research goal 
Both the ticket-balancing theory and the theory of changed dynamics were put forward in an 
effort to explain the modern vice presidential selections. The theory of increased complexity, 
on the other hand, was posited with a different research goal in mind: The empirical analysis 
by Baumgartner (2008) of which the theory of increased complexity is derived, was done in 
order to launch a prediction model of the 2008 vice presidential selection. Though the 
concepts of ‘prediction’ and ‘explanation’ are subject to much controversy in methodological 
literature, this thesis builds on an assumption that the difference between them is of a merely 
pragmatic character. At least in statistically oriented social science research, the logic of 
analysis is basically the same (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948; Hanna 1969: 309). That allows 
for the theory of increased complexity to be taken to account for the vice presidential 
selections of the entire period from 1940 to 2008, i.e. the variables that are used to forecast 
the outcome of future selections should also explain for the selections in the past.  
 
One could argue that the differing theoretical research goals could have an implication for the 
coherence of the theories. As noted above, the theory of increased complexity postulates the 
gradual emergence of the modern selection criteria in the historical selections of vice 
presidents. Yet, a forecasting model would implicitly benefit the most from capturing the 
currently prevailing mechanisms governing the vice presidential selections. That could lead to 
the assumption that the theory of increased complexity is less coherently constructed than the 
other two theories and that the explanatory power of the theory would be better for recent 
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selections than for earlier ones. However, this objection does not hold when considering that 
the forecasting model of the theory of increased complexity was constructed using the exact 
same methodological procedure as the two other theories. To check which variables that 
would influence the 2008 selection, Baumgartner (2008) relied on a statistical analysis of 
which variables that affected the selections of 1960 to 2004. As such, there should be no 
reason why these theories cannot be directly compared.  
 
3.3.2 Empirical track records 
The three theories have all been tested empirically in previous studies using the same 
statistical method (Sigelman and Wahlbeck 1997; Hiller and Kriner 2008; Baumgartner 2008). 
However, the tests were conducted on different datasets and with dissimilar variables. Thus, 
direct comparisons of the theories’ performance in these studies, are impossible. Still, one can 
remark on a clear tendency: The ticket-balancing theory performed the weakest. The 
explanatory variables did not perform in accordance with the theoretical expectations. In 
comparison, both the theory of changed dynamics and the theory of increased complexity 
faired better in the respective statistical tests of them. 
 
3.4 THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
As demonstrated in this chapter’s comparison of the three theories, they will yield very 
different hypotheses on the results of the thesis’ statistical analysis. Thus, to conclude the 
chapter, these hypotheses will be presented.  
 
3.4.1  The ticket-balancing theory  
The ticket-balancing theory assumes that all the traditional variables influence the selection of 
vice presidents positively. Presidential nominees tend to select running mates that balance the 
ticket in some way, have competed for the presidential nomination and/or come from a 
populous state. Furthermore, the theory does not expect this to have changed over time: The 
effects of the variables are depicted as stable and unvarying in the period from 1960 to 2008. 
On that basis, one can derive eight hypotheses from the theory, as presented in the table below. 
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Table 3.2 Ticket-balancing theory hypotheses 
Hypotheses Variable Effect on vice presidential selections 
H1 Regional balance Positive 
H2 Ideological balance Positive 
H3 Religious balance Positive 
H4 Demographical balance Positive 
H5 Balance of political experience Positive 
H6 Age balance Positive 
H7 Presidential rivalry Positive 
H8 Size of state Positive 
 
3.4.2 The theory of increased complexity 
Notably, seven of the eight hypotheses linked to the ticket-balancing theory are also in 
accordance with the theory of increased complexity (the exception being H6). However, the 
theory of increased complexity supplements the traditional criteria with seven modern 
selection criteria. Thus, seven corresponding hypotheses H9-H15 are presented. 
 
Table 3.3 Theory of increased complexity hypotheses 
Hypotheses Variable Effect on vice presidential selections 
H9 State competitiveness Positive 
H10 Ambition Positive 
H11 Media exposure Positive 
H12 Political experience Positive 
H13 Education Positive 
H14 Youth Positive 
H15 Military service Positive 
 
3.4.3 The theory of changed dynamics 
The theory of changed dynamics postulates that the traditional selection criteria only mattered 
in the period before the vice presidential selection in 1976. In the ensuing vice presidential 
selections, they had insignificant and/or unsubstantial effects. Instead, the selections after 
1972 are assumed by the theory to be dominated by one selection criteria alone: Political 
experience. This leaves three hypotheses to be deduced: 
 
Table 3.4 Theory of changed dynamics’ hypotheses on traditional selections 
Hypotheses Variable Effect on vice presidential selections 
H16 Geographical balance Positive only before 1976 
H17 Size of state Positive only before 1976 
H18 Political experience Positive only after 1972 
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3.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As demonstrated by this chapter, the three theories differ on many aspects. Still, the core 
difference between them is perhaps best conveyed by looking to two particular aspects: The 
main explanatory variables and the inclusion of time as a modifying variable. This is reflected 
in the eighteen hypotheses that are derived from the theories. They present traditional and 
modern explanatory variables to either have a constant or a time-limited effect on the vice 
presidential selections. These hypotheses will be tested in this thesis through the use of a 
conditional logistic model, a method that is presented in the following chapter.   
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4 THE CONDITIONAL LOGISTIC MODEL 
This chapter accounts for the thesis’ usage of the conditional logistic regression11. Firstly, it 
discusses the advantages of a statistical research design. Secondly, it argues that the 
conditional logistic regression is particularly suitable for the research question. Thirdly, it 
gives a formal presentation of the statistical model, as well as an explanation of how the 
results of the analysis are estimated and interpreted. Fourthly, it clarifies the fundamental 
properties and statistical requirements of the model. Lastly, the chapter explains how the 
conditional logistic regression is used to compare the three theories. 
 
4.1 STATISTICAL RESEARCH DESIGN 
Research methodology is often differentiated by the dichotomy of qualitative and quantitative. 
Adopting that vocabulary, the thesis takes a quantitative approach. There are two main 
reasons for this. First, the thesis focuses on the causal mechanisms that govern vice 
presidential selections. Statistical methods are well suited for investigating such causal 
relationships, largely because it provides the researcher with means to isolate the causal 
effects by holding other variables constant (Lijphart 1971). Second, the thesis covers the 
period from 1940 to 2008. This corresponds to a total of 27 vice presidential selections, all of 
which are between at least three candidates12. Thus, one can argue that the nature of the 
research question calls for a large-N study.  
  
 Of course, there are important trade-offs between quantitative and qualitative methods 
(Poteete and Ostrom 2005; King et al. 1994; George and Bennett 2005). Among the biggest 
potential downfalls for quantitative research design is the drawing of faulty causal inferences. 
An inevitable implication of large-N studies, as opposed to for example case studies, is a loss 
of detail. In the worst consequence, potentially important nuances can be overlooked, leading 
for example to overestimations of causal relationships (Ragin 2004). Necessarily, one must 
take steps to preclude such occurrences: Gaining thorough theoretical insight and being aware 
of issues related to validity and reliability may help remedy these problems (Adcock and 
Collier ; King et al. 1994).  
                                                 
11
 The conditional logistic regression is often also referred to as the conditional logit regression, the fixed-effects 
logistic regression, the discrete-choice model or (in economics) McFadden’s choice model. However, this thesis 
will consistently use the designation conditional logistic regression.  
12
 Excluding the two instances where the incumbent vice presidents were left on the ticket or was selected by the 
party convention, in the 1940 Republican selection and the 1956 Democratic selection. 
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4.2 THE ADVANTAGES OF THE CONDITIONAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION 
The dependent variable in this thesis’ analysis is binary: Either the potential vice presidential 
candidate was selected or not. This entails that a form of logistic regression is appropriate 
(Hair 2008: 355). Yet, conditional logistic regression is preferable over simple logistic 
regression. The reason lies mainly in the thesis’ theoretical foundation. Presidential nominees 
are in all three theories assumed to make choices between different vice presidential 
candidates and, importantly, these choices are based on the various attributes of the candidates. 
The conditional logistic regression is designed specifically for this type of choice-situation. It 
operates with alternative-specific variables, as opposed to standard logistic regression’s case-
specific variables. That means that the explanatory variables have different values for each 
choice alternative (instead of each decision-maker). Thus, it can model how the presidential 
nominees’ choice is affected by the characteristics of the vice presidential finalists (Long and 
Freese 2006: 297; Powers and Xie 2000: 239; Maddala 1983: 42).  
 
Another factor speaking for the suitability of the research method is the unconventional 
configuration of the thesis’ data material. The sets of alternatives that the presidential 
nominees have to choose from are not fixed. Both the number and characteristics of the 
alternative vice presidential candidates vary greatly between both party and election year. For 
example, whilst the 1944 Republican presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey had only two 
candidates on his shortlist, Democrat Walter Mondale considered eleven potential candidates 
in 1984. Though the common usage of conditional logistic regression is on data of choices 
between a fixed set of alternatives, it also allows for stratified data with varying choice sets. 
In such applications, each choice is modeled as a function of the alternatives that are available 
to the relevant decision-maker in that given year (Sigelman and Wahlbeck 1997; Powers and 
Xie 2000: 241; Pardoe and Simonton 2008: 6).  
 
4.3 THE MODEL  
The conditional logistic model was firstly developed by Daniel McFadden for the study of 
travel demand (Long 1997: 179; McFadden 1976). Later, its usage has been extended, and it 
has been applied in a variety of scientific studies investigating choices between discrete 
alternatives (e. g. Hausman et al. 1995; Hensher et al. 2005; Iain Pardoe 2008; Pardoe and 
Simonton 2008; Boskin 1974; Alvarez and Nagler 1998).  
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In the formalization of the model, the probability that an alternative j will be chosen is 
conditioned upon the likelihood that another alternative will be chosen instead. This is 
expressed by the following formula (Maddala 1983: 42): 
 
Prob [ ] )
( )
;
'exp
'exp(
1
∑
=
==
m
k
i
ij
i
x
xjy
β
β
   j ≠ k         
 
where Prob [ jyi = ] is the probability that a presidential nominee will select a candidate j 
from the pool of candidates i (demarcated by party and election year). That is estimated as a 
function of the characteristics ijx  of candidate j divided by the sum of the characteristics ix  of 
the other potential candidates m in the pool. k is each potential candidate that is considered by 
the presidential nominee. In accordance with the convention in the literature, k = 1, 2, …, m 
for the total of m alternative candidates.  
 
4.3.1 Estimation  
Most statistical software packages estimate the conditional logistic regression model. This 
thesis uses the .clogit command in STATA.  
 
As in standard logistic regression, the estimation procedure for the conditional logistic 
regression is Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). The model estimates the probability of 
an event occurring (in this case, the selection of a vice presidential finalist). Also, like in 
simple logistic regression, the binary character of the dependent variable in the conditional 
logistic model constrains this predicted value to the range between 0 and 1. To move beyond 
this limitation and transform the dichotomous dependent variable into a metric variable of 
both negative and positive values, a two-step calculation process of the probability is 
conducted. Firstly, the probabilities are restated into odds. In this application, the odds is the 
probability of the selection of a vice presidential candidate divided by the probability of the 
same candidate not being selected. Secondly, the logit values are calculated. That is done by 
taking the logarithm of the odds. Effectively, this means that odds less than 1 will have a 
negative logit value, whereas odds greater than 1 will have a positive logit value (Hair 2008: 
361; Powers and Xie 2000).  
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4.3.2 Interpretation 
The logit coefficients, odds and probabilities can all be used to retract information of the 
independent variables’ effect on the vice presidential selections.  
 
The logit coefficients are not as intuitively interpretable as coefficients in linear regression. 
They are expressed in terms of logarithms, a unit of measure that is not easily understandable 
when depicting change of probabilities. Thus, they give little substantial information about 
effect sizes. Rather, they indicate the direction of the relationship, whether it is positive or 
negative. Also, they are tested for statistical significance through the use of the Wald statistic, 
which is the logistic regression’s functional equivalent to the t value in linear regression. In 
this respect, the thesis will take a liberal approach, accepting p-values that are above the 
standard .05 threshold as statistically significant. That is both justified both by sample size 
(the N is 168, which is quite small in a quantitative context) and the arbitrariness of even 
setting such a threshold (Gelman and Stern 2006; Cohen 1990).  
 
In contrast to the logit coefficients, the odds can be used to measure effect sizes, specifically 
through the odds ratio. When dealing with an alternative-specific independent variable, this 
ratio is calculated by comparing the odds of two neighboring units on a specific variable. 
Thus, it is the multiplicative effect of a unit change in the variable on the odds of vice 
presidential selection. Odds over 1 would indicate a positive effect, whilst odds ratios below 1 
indicate a negative effect. For example, if investigating the effect of age on the vice 
presidential selection: A hypothetical odds ratio of 2 would mean that if a candidate of any 
age was one year older, his odds of being selected would multiply by a factor of 2 (Long and 
Freese 2006: 299)13. This can also be transformed into percentages: A factor change of 2 is 
equal to a percentage change of a 100 %14. 
  
Notably, when comparing the effect size of variables, two factors must be taken into 
consideration. Firstly, because the odds ratios are multiplicative, positive effects have factor 
changes greater than one and negative effects are bounded between 0 and 1. This has 
implications for comparisons of effect magnitudes: Positive effects are compared to negative 
effects by taking the inverse of the negative effect. Continuing with the above-mentioned 
example: A positive odds ratio of 2 would have the same magnitude as a negative odds ratio 
                                                 
13
 Notably, that the odds are doubled does not mean that the probabilities are doubled too. 
14
 To recalculate factor changes into percentage changes: 100(factor change-1) = percentage change (Long and 
Freese 2006: 180). 
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of .5 = ½ (Long and Freese 2006: 179). Secondly, comparisons of the magnitudes of different 
variables’ odds ratios are only meaningful if the variables are coded the same way and have 
the same units. That entails that the effect sizes of dummy variables can be directly compared 
to each other, but not to metric variables15.  
 
The predicted probabilities are also useful in conditional logistic regression analyses. This 
measure gives an accurate estimate of the likelihood of a vice presidential finalist being 
selected in each selection pool. The candidates’ probabilities sum to 1 for each pool and the 
finalist with the highest probability within the pool is most likely to become selected. Thus, 
the probabilities gives valuable information of whether the vice presidential selections that 
were made correspond to the statistical predictions and/or theoretical expectations.  
 
4.3.3 Assessing the overall model  
To evaluate conditional logistic regression models’ fit, the thesis primarily uses the following 
measures: The likelihood ratio test, the adjusted McFadden’s R2, and the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). However, before presenting these indicators in further detail, a 
note of caution must be included: They should only be treated as rough indicators of a 
model’s adequacy. The information provided by the measures is only partial and must be 
assessed within the context of the theoretical foundation of the analysis, past research and the 
estimated parameters of the models being considered (Long and Freese 2006). This is also the 
reason why several different measures of model suitability are considered by the thesis.  
 
The first measure, the likelihood ratio test and its associated test of statistical significance, 
evaluates whether the model’s fit to the data is better than mere chance. As such, it is 
functionally analogous to the F-test in linear regression, being an absolute measure of overall 
model significance. The test is based on the logarithm of the likelihood value, which works as 
an indicator of a model’s lack of fit: A “perfect fit” is represented by a log likelihood of 016. 
Thus, the chi-square test compares the log likelihood value of the estimated model of interest 
to the base model of null parameters. The comparison is done by taking the difference in the 
log likelihood values between the two models (the base model and the estimated model) and 
                                                 
15
 In simple logistic regression, coefficients that are standardized to a unit variance for the dependent variable are 
often used for comparisons between metric variables of different units (Menard 2004 ). However, Stata does not 
estimate standardized coefficients for the conditional logistic regression model (Long and Freese 2006: 95). 
16
 The “perfect fit” is more a theoretical concept than a practical one. If the R2 in fact reached the value 1, it 
would rather be indicative of a flawed model (see Greene 2003: 683). 
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multiplies this with -217 . The resultant value is subsequently compared to a chi-squared 
statistic with degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated parameters for the two 
models (assuming that the sample size is constant)18. The formula for the test is the following 
(Hensher et al. 2005: 330): 
 
-2 (LLbase model – LLfull model) ~ X2(number of new parameters estimated in the estimated model)     
 
If the likelihood ratio test is statistically significant, that means that the estimated model 
significantly improves the log likelihood function of the base model (by reducing the log 
likelihood to a value closer to 0). Thus, one can reject the null hypothesis that the estimated 
model is no better than the base model, and assume that the estimated model is statistically 
significant overall (Hensher et al. 2005: 330; Meyers et al. 2006: 238).  
 
Notably, the likelihood-ratio test can also be used to compare the fit of two models (Long and 
Freese 2006: 236). The same logic applies, but the comparison is not between an estimated 
model and the null model, but rather between two models. The single requirement is that the 
two models are nested. That means that the only difference between the models is that one of 
them has added one or more variables. In that case, one can observe whether the added 
variables represent a significant contribution for the model’s fit.  
 
The second indicator of goodness-of-fit is the adjusted McFadden’s R2, a measure that Train 
(2003: 72) recommends especially for models of choices between discrete alternatives19. Like 
the chi-square test, the McFadden’s R2 compares the log likelihood value of the estimated 
model with a base model. However, instead of measuring absolute model significance, it 
provides a relative estimate of how well the model fit the data. If the full model fit is no better 
than the null model, the McFadden’s R2 would equal 0 and in case of a perfect fit, the statistic 
would be 1. Following this, the measure is parallell to the R2 in linear regression, in that it is 
bounded between the values of 0 and 1. Yet, it does not have the same interpretation of 
“explained variance” as the R2: It measures the percentage of increased performance from the 
base model to another, but the meaning of such percentage increase is not intuitively clear. 
Thus, the only possible interpretation of the measure is that the model with the highest value 
has the better fit (Christensen 1997: 128).  
                                                 
17
 The -2Log Likelihood is also frequently referred to as deviance. 
18
 Thus, in the analysis, the test is denoted Chi2 (degrees of freedom). 
19
 Train refers to the measure as the likelihood ratio index. 
 32 
 
The adjusted version of the measure is preferable because it penalizes the model for including 
more predictors. For models containing effective predictors, this penalty will be small relative 
to the added information of the predictors. In contrast, for models comprising predictors that 
do not add enough information, the adjusted R2 may decrease with the addition of a predictor. 
This is formalized in the following manner (Hensher et al. 2005: 337):  
 
R2 =1− LLE − K
LLB
,          
 
where K is the number of parameters included in the model, LLE  is the log likelihood of the 
estimated model and LLB  is the log likelihood of the base model. Notably, when using the 
adjusted McFadden’s R2, negative values becomes a possibility. Values below 0 indicates a 
high penalty for including inefficient predictors (and consequently a very low model fit). 
         
                    
The third likelihood-based indicator of model fit is the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC)20. Following Long and Freese (2006: 112), BIC for the model Mk is defined as 
 
BIC = -2 ln L (Mk) – dfk ln N          
 
Thus, like the chi-square test, the BIC uses the -2Log Likelihood as point of departure, but 
subtracts the degrees of freedom (df) in the model and multiplies it with the logarithm of the 
total number of observations in the model (N). The formula shows that, like the adjusted 
Mcfadden’s R2, BIC introduces a penalty term for the number of parameters in the model and 
can also take a negative value.  
 
Notably, the BIC is also a relative measure: The idea is to compare models. The model with 
the lowest BIC value represent the best fit and should thus be preferred (Powers and Xie 2000: 
106). How strong that preference is, depends on the magnitude of the difference between the 
models. The suggested guidelines for the strength of evidence are presented in the table below. 
 
 
                                                 
20
 There are at least three different ways of defining the BIC statistic, but the definitions will all yield the same 
relative results (Long and Freese 2006: 113) 
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Table 4.1 Strength of evidence based on the difference in BIC 
Absolute difference in BIC Evidence 
0-2 Weak 
2-6 Positive 
6-10 Strong 
>10 Very strong 
Source: (Long 1997: 112) 
 
Finally, an estimate of the actual versus predicted vice presidential selection can be used to 
assess a model’s predictive capacity. The percentage of correct predictions out of the total 
number of predictions is calculated, based on the premise that only one of the alternatives can 
be chosen in each selection pool21. However, this measure is subject of criticism, both for 
being based on incorrect premises and for being inaccurate. Firstly, Train (2003: 73) warns 
that the practice of measuring correctly predicted cases is based on a wrongful assumption 
that the researcher has complete information. Choice probabilities should ideally be 
interpreted to mean that if the choice was conducted numerous times, each alternative would 
be chosen a certain proportion of the time. However, in using the number of correctly 
predicted cases as a measure of goodness-of-fit, one rather implies that the alternative with the 
highest probability will be chosen every time. Secondly, the measure is criticized for being 
influenced by “luck”, as any model, regardless of explanatory power, would be able to 
generate correct predictions. For example, a choice model with a fixed choice set consisting 
of two alternatives should by chance be able to predict at least 50% of the cases (Long 1997: 
107; Wooldridge 2009: 518) 
 
In spite of these objections, the thesis still includes the percentage of correctly predicted cases, 
but more as a descriptive summary of a model’s predictive capacity than as a direct measure 
of model fit (Greene 2003: 685; Costanzo et al. 1982). The claim is that the measure provides 
valuable information about a model’s specific predictions that the other three measures of 
model fit cannot. Though the main object of the thesis is to evaluate the explanatory capacity 
of the different theoretical variables, the theory of increased complexity was explicitly 
constructed with prediction as the research goal22. Thus, it seems relevant to estimate the 
accuracy of the model’s predictions as a part of the general assessment of the models.  
 
                                                 
21
 For models with dichotomous outcome variables, the percentage of correct predictions is conventionally 
estimated by applying a basic prediction rule of a .5 threshold, meaning that values over .5 predicts that the event 
occurred (the vice presidential candidate was selected). However, for this application, the specification of a cut-
off point is irrelevant: The prediction would be that the finalist with the highest probability value in the selection 
pool will be the chosen one. 
22
 See chapter 3, section 3.6 for a discussion of explanation vs prediction. 
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Also, to counter Train’s (2003) argument of the wrongful underlying assumptions of the 
measure: In this thesis’ application, the idea of repeating vice presidential selections under 
identical circumstances is both impossible and irrelevant. It is rather the predictability of the 
single winner in each selection pool that constitutes a point of interest.  The thesis thus 
contends that one must accept the inherent flaws of the measure, and rather treat the results of 
the estimate with some caution. It should not be interpreted as a direct indicator of neither 
model fit nor explanatory capacity, but more as information of the model’s predictive capacity 
that is subordinate to the other measures of model fit. 
  
4.4 MODEL PROPERTIES 
4.4.1 Discrete choice and utility maximization 
The conditional logistic model can be placed in the category of discrete choice models. Such 
models are characterized specifically by the existence of an exhaustive, yet finite choice set of 
mutually exclusive alternatives. Also, they are derived from an assumption of utility-
maximizing behavior on the part of the decision-maker: Faced with a range of alternatives, the 
decision-maker will select the alternative that is associated with the greatest utility. Thus, the 
probability of an individual selecting alternative j is equal to the probability that alternative j 
has greater or equal utility to the decision-maker than any other alternative.  
 
However, as no researcher can fully measure all aspects of neither the decision-makers’ 
thought processes nor the alternatives’ various attributes, one must also include a measure of 
randomness. The behavioral rule is modified into one of random utility maximization. That 
means that the probability of an individual choosing alternative j is the same as the probability 
that the unknown difference in utility between j and any other alternative is not bigger than 
the difference that is known (Hensher et al. 2005:82-83).  
 
4.4.2 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
The conditional logistic model is an extreme generalization of a complex social process. That 
is especially visible when it comes to the property referred to as the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). This assumption has been criticized for being both naïve and 
unrealistic (Olsen 1982), but scholars also emphasize its scientific value: “… it is on balance a 
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very useful simplification that may not necessarily be too unreasonable” (Hensher et al. 2005: 
479).  
 
Simply put, IIA assumes that the odds of an alternative being chosen over another is 
independent of all other available alternatives (Powers and Xie 2000). In the case of this 
thesis, that means that changes in the shortlist do not affect the odds among the alternative 
candidates that remain on the list. For example, if Barack Obama considered Democrat Joe 
Biden to be preferable to the other candidates in the selection pool in 2008, that would not be 
changed by the fact that Evan Bayh suddenly was eliminated from the shortlist. Nor would the 
addition of a supplementary candidate on the shortlist change the fact that Biden would be 
chosen before Bayh. 
 
An implication of the IIA is that all alternatives are perceived as equally similar (or dissimilar) 
to each other (Amemiya 1981). This can be problematic in some cases, as is illustrated by the 
classic red bus-blue bus example. In the choice between different transportation modes, the 
IIA would assume that the likelihood of a person selecting a car or a blue bus is unaffected by 
the addition of a third alternative in the form of a red bus. That the red bus and the blue bus 
are more similar to each other than to the car would not be accounted for, and the probability 
of selecting a car would be made arbitrarily small (Long and Freese 2006; Hensher et al. 
2005).  Consequently, the conditional logistic model would be inappropriate in the analysis of 
such a choice set, as the IIA assumption would clearly be invalid.  
 
IIA can be tested statistically, most frequently through so-called choice set partitioning tests, 
the two most common being the Hausman-McFadden test and the Small-Hsiao test. They 
work by re-estimating the model with a restricted set of choices and compare the estimated 
coefficients from the full model to those from the limited model (if the IIA holds, the results 
should be similar) (Long 1997). Yet, these tests are severely criticized for being inadequate 
means for assessing violations of the IIA property. Firstly, when conducted on the same 
applications, the Hausman-McFadden test and the Small-Hsiao test often provide conflicting 
results (i.e. some tests indicate violation of IIA, whilst others do not) (Long and Freese 2006: 
243). Secondly, in Cheng and Long’s experiments (2007) where they examined the different 
choice set partitioning tests, the tests were found to have poor size properties, even in large 
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sample sizes23. Their overall conclusion was that the “tests of the IIA assumption that are 
based on the estimation of a restricted choice set are unsatisfactory for applied work” (Cheng 
and Long 2007: 599)24.  
 
Following this, the best advice regarding IIA seems to be the statement made by McFadden 
(1973) that conditional logistic models should only be used in the cases where one can assume 
that the alternatives are distinct and given independent weight by the decision-makers (Long 
and Freese 2006: 243). Amemiya (1981: 1517) has also suggested that the models work well 
when the alternatives can be perceived as dissimilar. In this vein, the thesis contends that the 
vice presidential finalists meet these requirements. Though they may share commonalities, the 
finalists are still individuals with different personal qualities. There are no obvious reasons 
why presidential nominees should perceive them to be anything but dissimilar. Continuing 
with the above-mentioned example: It seems completely irrational to suspect that if Obama 
prefers Biden over Bayh, he will change his preference to Bayh when he finds out that a third 
candidate (say for example Chet Edwards) was eliminated from the shortlist. Hence, an 
assumption of IIA seems highly plausible.  
 
4.4.3 Within-group variance 
Seeing as the conditional logistic regression is applied to a stratified sample, it has a specific 
requirement for the distribution of the variables. For a variable’s effects to be estimated, it is 
not enough that the variable varies within the dataset. It also needs to have within-group 
variance, i. e. to vary between the alternative candidates in the different selection pools. 
 
Of course, not all variables will meet the criterion of within-group variance in all selection 
pools. An illustration of this is the Republican vice presidential selection in 1944. On that 
occasion, the choice was between two candidates, Earl Warren and John W. Bricker. These 
candidates both hailed from states that had 25 electoral votes in 194425. Hence, their score on 
the variable measuring the number of states’ electoral votes is identical and the variable has 
no effect on the choice between them (Pardoe and Simonton 2008: 7). Yet, this example is not 
                                                 
23The assessment of size properties implies comparing the nominal significance level of a test (e.g., .05, .10) 
with the empirical significance level in the data structure that does not violate the assumption being evaluated 
(the proportion of times that the correct null hypothesis is rejected over a large number of replications).  
24
 Cheng and Long (2007: 599) assessed the tests on the basis of a multinomial logit model, but the authors 
explicitly state that the results also applies to conditional logit models 
25
 Earl Warren was the governor of California, whilst John W. Bricker was a senator from Ohio.  
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at all problematic, because the lack of variance is a random, one-time occurrence and not a 
part of a larger, recurring pattern.  
 
A more problematic example is Jimmy Carter’s vice presidential selection in 1970. It has been 
reported that the primary selection criterion for him was regional balance. He would not even 
consider candidates that came from the same Southern region as himself (Rosenstone 1983). 
Thus, in that specific selection pool, the regional balance variable’s true effect would be very 
positive. Politicians hailing from other regions than Carter would have much greater chances 
of being selected than politicians from a Southern state. Yet, this positive effect is not 
captured by the conditional logistic regression, since all finalists are assigned the same value. 
Logically, if this is a recurring pattern, it would lead to a bias in the variable: If Carter’s focus 
on regional balance was the norm for vice presidential selections and most pools did not 
include candidates that balance the ticket regionally, the regional balance variable’s positive 
effect would be underestimated.  
  
This potential of bias must necessarily be considered an inherent limitation of the thesis’ 
application of conditional logistic regression analysis. Since the shortlist is assembled by the 
same presidential nominee that makes the final choice, it is plausible that such underlying 
systematic patterns will occur.  However, this limitation will be sought remedied in this thesis, 
through a thorough descriptive exploration of the variables and their values within the 
different selection pools. Such an exploration will reveal if any of the independent variables 
have a remarkably low level of within-group variance. Furthermore, it will observe whether 
that lack of variance is caused by the predominance of one particular value (for example that 
all finalists represent regional balance) and thus can cause a biased variable. This thesis’ 
chapter 6 will include the descriptive exploration of the within-group variance. 
 
4.4.4 Multicollinearity 
As in linear regression, logistic regression would be affected by high degrees of correlations 
between the independent variables. High correlation between several independent variables is 
referred to as multicollinearity. This phenomenon would potentially cause a substantial 
distortion of the variable estimates; the standard error would increase and both coefficients 
and the significance test would become unreliable measures. Though not biasing the results in 
a statistical sense, the multicollinearity makes it difficult to identify which explanatory 
variable one should attribute the effect on the dependent variable. Thus, the model’s capacity 
 38 
to generalize about the variables’ effects is effectively diminished. Any researcher is advised 
to include variables that have low multicollinearity, often indicated by the tolerance value of 
the variables (Hair 2008: 226; Allison 1999; Menard 2002) 26 . The proper remedy of 
multicollinearity (for example removing a variable or creating an index) must take both 
theoretical and statistical aspects into account. Sometimes the collinearity is an inherent 
attribute of the phenomenon that is measured, and other times the researcher can create 
(unnecessary) situations of collinearity, through for example the use of several dummy-
variables representing different values of non-metric variables etc (Hair 2008: 266). 
 
4.5 MODEL COMPARISON AND CONSTRUCTION 
In order to compare the statistical performance of the three theories, three separate conditional 
logistic models are constructed. Each model represents a test of one of the theories and 
includes only the variables that the respective theory portrays as relevant.  
 
An inevitable implication of this is that no control variables (from the other theoretical 
perspectives) will be included in these individual models. That could lead to concerns of 
omitted variable bias, as independent variables that could conceivably explain some of the 
variation in the dependent variable are intentionally excluded (King et al. 1994: 168-169). Yet, 
this procedure is followed in a tribute to the shared premise of the theories, which is that they 
all proclaim (more or less) a capacity to explain the vice presidential selections alone. 
Assuming that this is the case, control variables derived from the competing theories would 
reduce the respective theory’s fit to the empirical data as measured by the adjusted 
McFadden’s R2 and the BIC.  
 
The concern of excluding relevant variables will rather be met in the second step of the thesis’ 
analysis chapter: The variables that demonstrate any efficacy/explanatory merit in the 
individual assessment of the theories will be included in a final synthesis model. In that model, 
variables pertaining to different theories will be controlled against each other, consequently 
providing a basis for conclusions of which variables that offer the most insight into the 
dynamics of vice presidential selection.  
 
                                                 
26
 The tolerance is 1 minus the proportion of the variable’s variance explained by the other independent variables. 
A high value indicates low collinearity, while tolerance values close to 0 indicate that the variable is almost 
completely explained by the other variables (Menard 2002: 76). 
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The final synthesis model could also resolve another possible problem of the individual 
theoretical models, namely lack of parsimony. Notably, this is never a statistical problem for 
this thesis. The ratio of number of observations to each variable is at all times well above the 
critical threshold of 5:1 (Hair 2008: 196), even when modeling the admittedly far-from-
parsimonious theory of increased complexity27. Nevertheless, parsimony also has theoretical 
advantages. Though one should not necessarily consider it an absolute scientific goal, simple 
explanations are often better than complex ones (King et al. 1994).  
 
                                                 
27
 The thesis will at most include 14 variables (in the model testing the theory of increased complexity) on a 
sample of 168 observations, the ratio thus being over 12:1. 
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5 DATA  
The thesis draws upon two separate datasets, compiled by Mark Hiller and Douglas Kriner 
(2008) and by Jody Baumgartner (2008) for their respective analyses of vice presidential 
selection. Though these datasets are similar, they differ on fundamental aspects. Therefore, 
the thesis will use a combination of the two. This chapter presents the combined dataset and 
discusses its validity. Also, operationalizations of the different variables are introduced.  
 
For reasons of concision, the two datasets will be designated with abbreviated names. 
Hereinafter, Hiller and Kriner (2008)’s dataset will be referred to as H&K, whilst 
Baumgartner (2008)’s dataset will be referred to as JB.  
 
5.1 TIME SPAN 
Both datasets focus on the vice presidential selections that were made personally by the 
presidential nominees. However, they cover different time periods. Whilst H&K includes 
selections from 1940 to 2004, JB spans from 1960 to 2008. This thesis will take an inclusive 
approach: In order to maximize the number of observations, the dataset covers all selections 
made by the presidential candidates from 1940 to 2008. After excluding the two instances 
where the presidential nominee did not make the selection themselves (the 1940 Republican 
selection and the Democratic selection of 1956) and the seven occasions where the incumbent 
vice president have sought re-elections, the dataset covers a total of 27 vice presidential 
selections.  
  
5.2 UNITS OF OBSERVATION 
Identifying the persons that were seriously considered for the vice presidency is a complicated 
affair. There is no official source for this kind of information. One must rely mainly on 
secondary sources, in particular the media’s coverage of the “veepstakes”. Yet, the 
trustworthiness of such media reports must be problematized. Though some presidential 
nominees have conducted rather public searches for running mates (specifically Carter in 
1976, Mondale in 1984 and Dukakis in 1988), the norm has rather been for presidential 
nominees to keep their vetting processes secretive affairs (Purdum 2004).  Obviously, that has 
rendered political commentators to present more or less unfounded speculations, causing a 
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multitude of names to be floated as potential vice presidential candidates (Sigelman and 
Wahlbeck 1997).  
 
The difficulty of determining the identity of the vice presidential finalists is reflected in the 
two datasets. There is an obvious divergence between them: They have not included the same 
units of observation in each selection pool. Focusing only on the time period that the two 
datasets are overlapping (1960 to 2004), there are twenty-three units of observations that are 
included only in one of the datasets. This complicates the task of combining the datasets, as 
these twenty-three “critical cases” require particular scrutiny.  
 
5.2.1  “Critical cases” 1940-1992 
For the selections up to 1992, both datasets H&K and JB have relied on the same primary 
source of information: The list of potential vice presidential candidates that was firstly 
compiled by Goldstein (1982) and later updated by Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997), ranging 
from 1940 to 1992.  However, there are notable discrepancies between the datasets. H&K has 
adapted Sigelman and Wahlbeck’s list without exceptions, whereas JB has made 
modifications. Four finalists that were on the original list are excluded, whereas another six 
finalists are added in the JB dataset. 
 
The table below gives an overview of the “critical cases” of the dataset from 1960 to 1992, 
sorted in chronological order. It shows in which of the H&K datasets the finalist was included 
(and excluded) and finally whether or not the finalist was incorporated as part of the dataset in 
the thesis. 
 
Table 5.1 The “critical cases” 1960-1992. 
Units of observation 
Year(Party) Finalist 
Dataset 
H&K 
Dataset 
JB 
The thesis’ 
Dataset 
1964 (R)  Rockefeller, Nelson  X  
1968(D)  Rockefeller, Nelson X  X 
1968(D)  Alioto, Joseph D.  X X 
1968(D)  Kennedy, Edward  X  
1968(R)  Bush, George H. W.  X X 
1976(D)  Muskie, Edmund X  X 
1980(R)  Ford, Gerald X  X 
1988(R)  Dole, Robert X  X 
1992(D)  Cuomo, Mario  X X 
1992(D)  Gephardt, Richard  X  
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The table shows that the four finalists that are omitted from dataset JB, but included in H&K, 
are the following: Nelson Rockefeller in 1968, Edmund Muskie in 1976, Robert Dole in 1988 
and Gerald Ford in 1980. This thesis follows the strategy of H&K, and includes all these units 
of observation in the final dataset, for the following reasons.   
 
Firstly, Nelson Rockefeller was excluded from the Democratic selection pool in 1968 in the 
JB dataset because of his affiliation with the Republican Party: “…there has been no cases of 
a presidential candidate selecting a running mate from the opposing party since the Civil 
War” (Baumgartner 2008: 770)28 . Though this is undoubtedly true, there is, however, a 
different way of assessing this issue. One can argue that the historical absence of bipartisan 
tickets does not necessarily entail that politicians from the opposing parties have never been 
considered as running mates by the presidential candidates. As a matter of fact, there are 
indications of the opposite. The most recent example is the Republican selection pool of 2008. 
According to Baumgartner’ s own research (2008: 770), Democrat Joe Lieberman was on 
John McCain’s final shortlist. Thus, the thesis will include Rockefeller in the 1968 
Democratic vice presidential selection, despite his association with the Republican Party. 
 
 Secondly, in the case of Muskie, Dole and Ford, the argument for their exclusion from JB is 
based on their political backgrounds. Muskie and Dole had previously run for vice president 
and Ford had even served as president. The claim is that they would have smaller chances of 
being selected. However, these are subjective judgments that contradict contemporary 
accounts of the selections (Natoli 1980a; Ions 1977; Light 1984). Also, it runs counter to parts 
of this thesis’ theoretical framework. The theory on changed dynamics postulates that such 
political experience would in fact be considered a highly beneficial asset by the presidential 
nominees. Their political background will therefore not be reckoned as adequate reasons for 
excluding them from the analysis in this thesis29.  
 
The JB dataset also comprises six finalists that are neither included in H&K, nor the lists 
compiled by Goldstein (1982) and Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997). Specifically, these are 
Nelson Rockefeller in the Republican pool of 1964, Joseph D. Alioto and Edward Kennedy in 
                                                 
28
 Baumgartner has in his previous work (2006: 66) listed Rockefeller as one of the candidates that were 
considered for the Democratic vice presidency both in 1968 and also in 1964 (though this is not repeated in the 
article from 2008). 
29
 Ford had only served one term as president, and his selection could therefore not be seen as a violation of the 
22nd Amendment of the Constitution. Had Ford, on the other hand, served two terms, it would probably give rise 
to legal objections, though experts in constitutional law disagree on the subject (Baker 2006). 
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the Democrat pool of 1968, George H. W. Bush in the Republican pool of 1968 and finally 
Mario Cuomo and Richard A. Gephardt in the Democratic pool of 1992. After consulting 
various scholarly and academic sources, as well as an intensive search in various news reports 
that were published around the time of the announcements of the vice presidential nominees, 
the thesis includes three of these units of observations, Alioto, Bush and Cuomo, in the final 
dataset.  
 
Rockefeller is not included as a Republican vice presidential finalist in 1964 due to his 
publicly declared feud with the Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater. Rivalling 
Goldwater for the presidential nomination, Rockefeller repeatedly denounced Goldwater as an 
extremist in the media. After the nomination, Rockefeller refused to endorse Goldwater’s 
candidacy and did not participate in his campaign (Converse et al. 1965: 326). Thus, it is 
considered unlikely that Goldwater seriously considered him as a running mate.  
 
When it comes to the vice presidential selections of 1968, sources lists both Alioto and Bush 
as being on the final shortlists for their respective parties (White 1969; Roberts 1968). Thus, 
they will be added to the thesis’ dataset. Democrat Ted Kennedy, on the other hand, is not 
included. Early in the campaign, he had taken himself out of the running for the vice 
presidential nomination by publicly declaring that he would not accept the position if it was 
offered to him (Wickers 1968).  
 
The Democratic vice presidential selection in 1992 was a particularly secretive process. Thus, 
there were extensive unconfirmed speculations in the media on the subject of Bill Clinton’s 
running mate. Both Cuomo and Gephardt were therefore brought up in news reports as vice 
presidential potentials (Ifill 1992b). However, there is an observable difference in the media 
coverage of these two politicians. Despite rumors of his disinterest in the position, Cuomo is 
more frequently referred to as a serious contender, and often with reference to “sources within 
the Clinton campaign” (Ifill 1992a; Toner 1992; Sack 2008). Also, in Ceaser and Busch’s  
account of the Clinton campaign (1993: 70), Cuomo is mentioned as a likely vice presidential 
finalist (albeit with the reservation that he was “probably less seriously considered”), whereas 
Gephardt was not. Therefore, only Cuomo is included in the thesis’ data on the 1992 selection 
pool. 
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To sum up, out of the ten “critical cases” in the vice presidential selections from 1960 and 
1992, seven are finally included in the thesis’ dataset. The thesis’ dataset comprises all four 
finalists that were omitted from JB, but present in H&K. Also, it included three units of 
observations that were present in JB, but not in H&K. 
 
5.2.2  “Critical cases” 1996-2008  
For the selections of 1996 through 2004, the two datasets have been compiled independently, 
not relying on any existing literary work. In this period, there are twelve units of observations 
that are diverging between the datasets. However, the divergence reveals a clear pattern: JB 
has consistently added more finalists to each of the four selection pools between 1996 and 
2004. Only in the 2004 Democratic selection pool has H&K included a finalist that was 
excluded from the JB dataset. 
 
The table below gives an overview of the critical cases from 1992 to 2004.  
 
Table 5.2 The “critical cases” 1992-2004. 
Units of observation 
Year(Party) Finalist 
H&K JB The thesis’ 
Dataset 
1996 (R)  John McCain  X X 
1996 (R)  Don Nickles  X X 
1996 (R)  Tommy Thompson  X X 
1996 (R)  Connie Mack  X X 
2000 (D)  Jeanne Shaheen  X X 
2000 (D)  Richard Gephardt  X X 
2000 (R)  Bill Frist  X X 
2000 (R)  George Pataki  X X 
2000 (R)  Tom Ridge  X X 
2000 (R)  Fred Thompson  X X 
2004 (D)  Jeanne Shaheen  X X 
2004 (D)  John McCain X  X 
 
 
When deciding on whether to exclude or include these twelve cases in the thesis’ dataset, it 
was considered imperative to look at the specification of the criteria that has been used in the 
identification of the vice presidential finalists. Only Baumgartner specifies these selection 
criteria explicitly. When updating his dataset to include the selections of 1996 to 2008, he 
firstly consulted various scholarly and journalistic sources. Secondly, he cross-checked the 
resultant list with news articles that were published within the last week prior to the 
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announcement of the running mate and included references both to the shortlist and campaign 
sources (Baumgartner 2008:766).  
 
The thesis follows Baumgartner’s selection criteria. Thus, after verifying that the twelve 
finalists “critical cases” that are included in JB, actually have met these criteria, they are all 
added to the thesis dataset. The argument is that the thoroughness of Baumgartner’s case 
selection process reduces the likelihood of including candidates in the datasets that were never 
really considered (type 1 errors). Also, that the reliance on newspaper reports is limited to the 
final week before the announcement helps to ensure that politicians that were vetted, but 
rejected earlier in the process, would be eliminated.  
 
The only modification that is made to Baumgartner’s list of vice presidential finalists from 
1996-2008 is in the 2004 Democratic pool. The JB dataset does not include Republican John 
McCain as a finalist, for the same reason that Republican Nelson Rockefeller was excluded 
from JB’s Democratic pool of 1968. Thus, adhering to the arguments that affiliation with the 
opposing party does not necessarily prohibit a presidential nominee from considering a vice 
presidential candidate, the thesis follows the example of H&K and includes McCain in the 
2004 Democratic selection pool. As such, all the “critical cases” in the selection pools of 
1992-2004 are added to the thesis’ dataset.  
 
5.2.3 Influential cases? 
In total, the thesis’ dataset includes nineteen of the twenty-two “critical cases” in the selection 
pools from 1960 to 2004. However, when selecting such a strategy, attention should be paid 
to the potential impact it may have in the analysis. In his article, Baumgartner (2008: 770) 
reports that at least two of the units of observations that were excluded from JB, namely Ford 
in 1980 and McCain in 2004, “unfairly skewed the analysis inasmuch as they were predicted 
as the first choice for the nomination”. Notably, this thesis’ analysis will not be presented with 
the exact same problem. Since both Ford and McCain are coded as the first choice for the 
nominations in 1980 and 2004 (see section 5.3 below for an explanation of the dependent 
variable), any prediction of them as the winners of the selection pools would be welcome. The 
same goes for another one of the “critical cases”, Nelson Rockefeller in 1968. 
 
Nevertheless, Baumgartner’s observation of skewness directs the attention to the possibility of 
the remaining sixteen “critical cases” being outliers that might influence the analysis. 
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However, an examination of the Delta-Beta values of these units of observations warrants no 
such concerns. The Delta-Beta statistic is the recommended indicator of the influence of 
residuals (Long and Freese 2006: 151), measuring the difference in the coefficient vector that 
is caused by the deletion of a unit of observation (Pregibon 1981). As such, it is the logistic 
analog to Cook’s distance in linear regression: The higher Delta-Beta value an observation 
has, the more does it influence the results of the analysis. None of the sixteen units of 
observation in question showed elevated Delta-Beta values (for a complete table, see 
Appendix)30. Hence, there should be no statistical objections to including them in the thesis’ 
dataset. 
 
5.2.4 The complete list 
To sum up, the thesis takes the following strategy when combining the two datasets:  
 
Table 5.3 Combination of datasets H&K and JB. 
Selection pools Primary source Additions Number of finalists 
1940-1960 H&K None 33 
1960-1992 H&K + 3 from JB 96 
1996-2004 JB + 1 from H&K 29 
2008 JB None 10 
 
 Total 168 
 
H&K is adopted for the period of 1940 to 1960. For the selections of 1960 through 1992, 
H&K is used, with the exception of three units of observation that are added from JB. For the 
selections of 1996 through 2004, the thesis adapts JB, but one case is added from dataset 
H&K. Lastly, for the two selection pools of 2008, JB is the only dataset that includes this 
selection.  
 
The resultant list includes 168 units of observation, grouped in selection pools ranging from 
1940 to 2008. In this period, there were eighteen general elections and thus 36 vice 
presidential selections, but nine of these selections were decided without competition. Thus, 
the final number of selection pools is 27. The complete list is presented in table 5.4 below.  
 
                                                 
30
 Neither did the four “critical cases” that were not included in the thesis’ dataset. Their omission from the 
dataset is based purely on empirical reasons.  
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Table 5.4 The Finalist Pool, 1940-2008 
 Democratic party Republican party  Democratic party Republican party 
1940 Hulla 
Wallaceb 
Barkley 
 
Byrnes 
Douglas 
McNary 1976 Mondaleab 
Muskie 
Church 
Glenn 
Rodino 
Stevenson 
Jackson 
Doleab 
Armstrong 
Baker 
Ruckleshaus 
1944 Trumanab 
Barkley 
Byrnes 
Douglas 
Wallace 
Warrena 
Brickerb 
 
1980 Mondale Forda 
Bushb 
Baker 
Kemp 
Laxalt 
Lugar 
Rumsfeld 
Simon 
Van der Jagt 
1948 Douglasa 
Barkleyb 
 
Warrenab 
Bricker 
Halleck 
Stassen 
 
1984 Ferraroab 
Bentsen 
Bradley 
Bumpers 
Cisneros 
Collins 
Cuomo 
Dukakis 
Feinstein 
Glenn 
Goode 
Bush 
1952 Sparkmanab 
Chapman 
Kefauver 
Monroney 
Magnuson 
Russell 
Barkley 
Kerr 
Fulbright 
 
Nixonab 
Halleck 
Judd 
Knowland 
Langlie 
Thornton 
 
1988 Bentsenab 
Gephardt 
Glenn 
Gore 
Graham 
Hamilton 
Quayleab 
Alexander 
Deukmejian 
Domenici 
Dole 
Simpson 
Thompso
n 
1956 Kefauver Nixon 1992 Goreab 
Cuomo 
Graham 
Kerrey 
Rockefeller 
Wofford 
Quayle 
1960 Johnsonab 
Freeman 
Humphrey 
Jackson 
Symington Rockefellera 
Lodgeb 
Anderson 
Judd 
Mitchell 
Thuston 
Seaton 
Ford 
 
1996 Gore Kempab 
Campbell 
Edgar 
Engler 
 
Mack 
McCain 
Nickles 
Thompson 
1964 Humphreyab 
Kennedy, R. 
Mansfield 
McCarthy 
McNamara 
Shiver Millerab 
Ford 
Scranton 
2000 Liebermanab 
Bayh 
Edwards 
Gephardt 
Kerry 
Shaheen 
Cheneyab 
Danforth 
Frist 
Hagel 
Kasich 
Keating 
Pataki 
Ridge 
Thompson 
1968 Rockefellera 
Muskieb 
Harris 
Hughes 
Sanford 
Shiver 
Alioto 
Fincha 
Agnewb 
Baker 
Bush 
Rogers 
Volpe 
2004 McCaina 
Edwardsb 
Gephardt 
Graham 
Shaheen 
Vilsack 
Cheney 
1972 Kennedya 
Eagletonb 
Askew 
Church 
Mondale 
Nelson 
O’Brien 
Ribicoff 
Shiver 
White 
Agnew 2008 Bidenab 
Bayh 
Kaine 
Sebelius 
Edwards 
Palinab 
Pawlenty 
Ridge 
Romney 
Lieberman 
 
The two vice presidents that were either chosen by party delegates and the seven incumbents that were left on 
their tickets are listed in italics, but excluded from the analysis. 
aThe presidential nominee’s first choice for running mate. 
bActual nominee. 
 
5.3 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: FIRST-CHOICE 
As discussed in chapter three, the three theories differ when it comes to the 
operationalizations of the dependent variable. That renders the thesis with two possible ways 
of coding the dependent variable: Whether the finalists were actually nominated or not, or 
whether the finalists were firstly offered the nomination or not. Of course, the latter option is 
the most demanding in terms of documentation. To determine which candidates that were the 
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presidential nominees’ first choices, one must again rely on secondary, unofficial sources 
(that might convey both rumors and unfounded speculation). Nevertheless, the first-choice 
approach is the most theoretically salient. The thesis’ objective is to learn of the presidential 
nominees’ preferences for his running mate. Whether or not the chosen candidate in fact 
accepted the nomination should therefore be irrelevant. Thus, the candidates that were firstly 
asked by the presidential nominees are coded 1 and all other finalists are coded 031.  
 
According to Hiller and Kriner (2008), the first-choice candidate differs from the actual 
nominee on nine occasions. These were in the Democratic selections of 1940, 1948, 1968, 
1972 and 2004, and the Republican selections of 1944, 1960, 1968 and 1980. The thesis’ 
search for information upheld the validity of that list. However, some of these cases are 
established with more certainty than others. An example is the 1940 selection of the 
Democratic vice president: There is an overall concurrence in the literature that Cordell Hull 
was repeatedly asked by Franklin D. Roosevelt to join the ticket in 1940 (Williams 1956:177-
178; Goldstein 1982). In comparison, when it comes to the designation of John McCain as 
Kerry’s first choice in 2004, there exists no such agreement. Instead, that judgment was based 
on a review of various news reports (including an interview with McCain himself) claiming 
that there had been an offer from Kerry (Fournier 2004; Bumiller 2008; Halbfinger 2004; 
Hiller and Kriner 2008).  
 
5.4 INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
The coding of the variables in the thesis’ dataset stems for the most part from the two datasets 
H&K and JB. Still, as the thesis’ dataset is a combination of the two, there were a few 
observations of missing values. These missing values were filled in by turning to the same 
sources that are cited by Baumgartner (2008) and Hiller and Kriner (2008). These sources 
include both the empirical studies conducted by Sigelman and Wahlbeck (1997), descriptive 
works on the vice presidency (Goldstein 1982; Williams 1956), various encyclopedias and 
lexical sources (e. g. Congress 2008: The Biographical Directory of the United States 
                                                 
31
 There is an unavoidable possibility that the presidential nominee’s true favourite is not the same as the firstly 
asked candidate. For example, one could hypothesize that Bob Dole would have asked Colin Powell in 1996 if 
Powell had not made it absolutely clear that he would not accept such a bid. However, for the sake of a statistical 
analysis, it would be almost impossible to determine the true favourite of the presidential nominees. Also, it 
would be beside the point, as the goal is not to model hypothetical vice presidential selections, but rather the 
selections that were actually made.  
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Congress), and accounts of the various presidential campaigns (e. g. Polsby et al. 2008; 
Pomper 2001, 1997; Ceaser and Busch 2001, 1997, 2005; Wayne 2001). 
 
In total, there are twenty-one independent variables that will be included in the analysis.  The 
presentations of these are grouped according to their theoretical affiliation. 
 
5.4.1 Ticket-balancing theory - traditional variables 
Table 5.5 gives an overview of the variables pertaining to the ticket-balancing theory.  
 
Table 5.5 Variables of ticket-balancing theory 
Variable  Operationalization 
Regional balance Dummy 1=Coming from different region than presidential nominee 
Religious balance Dummy 1=Different religious affiliation than presidential nominee 
Ideological balance Dummy 1=Different ideological position than presidential nominee 
Demographic balance Dummy 1=Different gender or race than presidential nominee 
Age balance Dummy 1= < 10 years between finalist and presidential nominee 
Insider-outside balance Dummy 1=Finalist/pres. nom with no political experience from Washington 
Size of state Scale Percent of state’s electoral votes of national total 
Current rival Dummy 1=Rivalry for presidency in election cycle in question 
 
As seen in the table, all the six variables that measure a form of balanced ticket are coded as 
dummy variables. The value 1 denotes balance, whilst 0 obviously denotes non-balance.  
 
For the three variables measuring balance of geography, religion and ideology, the coding is 
based on a classification of categories. Regional balance is divided in five categories: Border, 
Northern, Southern, Midwestern and Western32 . Religious balance is constituted of four 
categories: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish or Greek Orthodox.  Ideological balance is 
based on a three-fold classification: Liberal, Moderate and Conservative. For these variables, 
                                                 
32
 Though the US Census of 2007 groups the states in four categories, the thesis follows Siegelman and 
Wahlbeck (1997) and Hiller and Kriner (2008: 412) in designating Border states as a separate category. The 
precise categorization of the regions are as follows: Border: DE, KY, MD, MO, WV; North: CT, MA, ME, NH, 
NJ, NY, PA; South: AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA; Midwest:  IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, 
NE, ND, OH, SD, WI; West: AK, AZ, CA, CO, MT, NM, OR, UT, WY, WA. In turn, this coding deviates from 
that of Baumgartner (2008), who included Pacific as a sixth region.  
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The coding of demographic balance takes both gender and race/ethnicity into account. If the 
vice presidential finalists and the presidential nominee are white (non-Hispanic) males, this 
variable is coded 0. In the cases where either (but not both) of these candidates lacks one of 
these characteristics, they are coded 1. This entails that in the cases where the presidential 
nominee and the vice presidential finalists are both of different genders and racial background 
(such as for example Barack Obama and Kathleen Sebelius in 2008), the finalist is assigned 
the value 0. 
 
Age balance is coded 1 if the vice presidential finalist is more than ten years younger (or older) 
than the presidential nominee. Balance of political experience is referred to as insider-outsider 
balance. An outsider is defined as a person that has never served in Congress nor ever held an 
important government position in Washington prior to the year in question. Tickets comprised 
of only one such outsider are coded 1. 
 
Size of state captures the number of electoral votes that each finalist’s home state possesses as 
a percentage of the national total in each election year. The higher value a finalist scores on 
this variable, the more electoral votes does his/her home state have.  
 
Presidential rivalry is measured through a dummy variable, labeled current rival. It is coded 1 
if the vice presidential finalist was a candidate for the presidential nomination of the year in 
question and therefore rivaled the presidential nominee. Notably, in measuring presidential 
rivalry, Siegelman and Wahlbeck (1997: 857) also included a variable measuring rivalry in 
previous election cycles. However, this thesis will not follow their example, as the inclusion 
of such a variable would pose a two-fold problem. First, a previous rival variable correlates 
strongly with current rival, and a model that included both would thus have been flawed with 
multicollinearity33. Second, the variable is not a part of the theoretical framework. The core of 
the ticket-balancing theory is that the presidential nominee looks to his competitors in the 
election cycle in question, and not in previous elections. Considering that the point of the 
statistical modeling in this thesis is to investigate the explanatory effect of the ticket-balancing 
theory, the inclusion of a variable that is not part of the theory (and can be questioned in terms 
of producing reliable results) seems pointless. 
 
                                                 
33
 The variables would correlate at .8 and both have relatively low tolerance values when included in the same 
model (.22 and .23), 
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5.4.2  The theory of increased complexity- modern variables 
An overview of the modern variables adhering to the theory of increased complexity is 
presented below.  
 
Table 5.6 Modern variables of the theory of increased complexity 
Variable  Operationalization 
State competitiveness Scale Average party difference in state’s 3 previous elections 
Ambition Dummy 1= Competed for presidency/considered for VP in previous elections 
Media exposure Scale Standardized measure, number of newspaper articles about finalist from January 1st previous year to June 30th election year 
Political experience Scale Log of finalist’s prior years of public service 
Education Dummy 1=Post-graduate education 
Age Scale Finalist’s age 
Military service Dummy 1=Military service 
VP=vice presidency 
 
 
The first of the variables, state competitiveness, is measured by looking to the three previous 
general elections that were held in the state. The difference between the percentage of votes 
for the Democratic Party and the Republican Party were recorded for all three years, and 
averaged. Thus, a smaller value would be indicative of a competitive state. 
 
The ambition variable measures whether or not the finalist has ever sought the presidency or 
been considered for the vice presidency in any previous election (not counting the election in 
question). If so, the dummy variable is coded 1. Notably, this ambition variable can be seen as 
an expanded version of the above-mentioned variable included in Siegelman and Wahlbeck 
(1997), measuring rivalry in previous election cycles. Yet, the objections against the previous 
rival variable were that it caused high collinearity in a model that also included the current 
rival and fell beyond the scope of the theory, and neither of these objections applies to the 
ambition variable.  
 
The media exposure variable is measured by searching the online archives of the New York 
Times (www.nytimes.com) and Time Magazine (www.time.com) for the finalists’ full names. 
The number of articles that were published by each newspaper from January 1st of the 
previous year through June 30th of the election year and that included a reference to the 
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finalists’ name was then recorded. However, the number of published articles varied greatly 
between the different finalists. Therefore, the two scores (for each newspaper) were 
standardized, before adding them to create an index of media exposure. 
 
For the variable measuring political experience, the focus is on the finalists’ political résumé. 
All previous public and government posts are recorded, including elected and appointed 
offices at the national, state and local levels. The years that the finalist spent in each of these 
positions are thereafter added. Yet, the number of years of political experience is expected to 
have a nonlinear effect. The difference between a finalist that has spent 10 years in political 
service and another that has a mere 5 years of experience is assumed to be greater than 
between finalists with 25 and 20 years experience. To account for that nonlinearity, the 
political experience variable takes the natural log of each finalist’s prior years of public 
service.  
 
The coding of the final three of the modern variables is relatively clear-cut. First, education is 
a dummy variable constructed to capture the difference between highly educated finalists and 
finalists with a “normal” level of education. 0 denotes that the finalist had no more than a 
four-year college degree, whilst 1 means that the candidate completed a post-graduate 
education of some sort. Second, military service is a dummy variable where the finalist is 
coded 1 if he/she had served in the military34 . Lastly, youth is measured indirectly, by 
recording the finalist’s age at the time of the election. Thus, the variable is labeled age.  
 
5.4.3 Variables of the “theory of changed dynamics” 
The core of the theory of changed dynamics is that the key independent variables would have 
different effects before and after 1976/1972. Therefore, the model will use the three variables 
political experience, size of state and regional balance that are defined above. These will be 
recoded into six variables: Each variable is split into a pre-1976 variable and a post-1972 
variable.  
 
 Thus, political experience is coded into a pre-1976 experience variable and a post-1972 
experience variable. For the pre-1976 experience variable, all finalists in selection pools after 
                                                 
34In 1973, the United States converted from a military draft to an all-volunteer military (Segal 1989). It can 
therefore be expected that vice presidential candidates before 1973 would have a higher probability of having 
served in the military. However, this will not be controlled for in the analysis. 
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1972 are given the value 0.  Conversely, for the post-1972 experience variable all finalists in 
selection pools before 1976 are coded 0. Thus, the variables will only measure the effect of 
political experience in one of these two time periods.  
 
The size of state and regional balance variables are recoded the same way: Each of the 
variables is split into two time-demarcated variables.  An overview of the operationalizations 
of the variables is presented in the table below. 
 
Table 5.7 Variables of the theory of changed dynamics 
Variables  Operationalizations 
Political experience pre-
1976 Scale 
Log of finalist’s prior years of public service 
Units of observation after 1972=0 
Political experience post-
1972 Scale 
Log of finalist’s prior years of public service 
Units of observation before 1976=0 
Size of state pre-1976 Scale Percent of state’s electoral votes of national total Units of observation after 1972=0 
Size of state post-1972 Scale Percent of state’s electoral votes of national total Units of observation before 1976=0 
Regional balance pre-1976 Dummy 1=Different regional belonging than presidential nominee Units of observation after 1972=0 
Regional balance post-1972 Dummy 1=Different regional belonging than presidential nominee Units of observation before 1976=0 
 
 
Notably, the two variables measuring political experience (pre-1976 and post-1972) correlate 
negatively (at -.8), and their tolerance levels when included in the same regression model are 
also relatively low (both at .2). This is understandable when taking into account that they 
measure the same phenomenon, only in different time periods. Yet, it might pose a problem 
for the statistical analysis, as high collinearity might make it difficult to determine the 
individual effect of the variables. However, this will be controlled for in the analysis. The 
model where these variables are both included will be replicated twice, the first time 
excluding the pre-1976 variable and the last time excluding the post-1972 variable. If there is 
no significant change in the variables’ effects between the models, the assumption is that the 
results are reliable.   
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The other time-demarcated variables measuring regional balance and size of state do not 
correlate to the same extent, and will thus not be subject to the same level of scrutiny in the 
analysis. 
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6 ANALYSES 
This chapter presents the thesis’ analyses. Firstly, some descriptive statistics of the variables 
are presented. This includes an overview of the range and distribution of all variables, as well 
as an exploration of the independent variables’ levels of within-group variance. Thereafter, 
the three theories of vice presidential selection are tested separately in three different 
conditional logistic regression models, labeled models 1, 2 and 3. These models are evaluated 
individually and comparatively, both in terms of overall model fit and the performance of the 
individual variables. Special emphasis is put on whether or not the variables’ effects comply 
with the expectations in hypotheses H1-H1835. Lastly, a new synthesis model, combining the 
vital explanatory elements of the former models, is constructed. That is done in two steps: 
First, a model 4 includes variables that were found in the former three models to significantly 
influence the selection of vice presidents. Second, model 5 excludes the variables that were 
inefficient in model 4. This final model thus provides a parsimonious and coherent 
explanation of the vice presidential selections.  
 
6.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – RANGE AND DISTRIBUTION 
The table below presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for 
both the dependent variable and the twenty-one independent variables, the latter organized 
according to their theoretical affiliation. 
                                                 
35
 See chapter 3, section 3.4.3, for tabulation of the hypotheses. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
 Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Minimum 
value 
Maximum 
value 
Dependent variable Vice presidential selection .16 .36 0 1 
Regional balance .86   .34 0 1 
Religious balance .36 .48 0 1 
Ideological balance .48 .5 0 1 
Demographic balance .08 .28 0 1 
Age balance .39 .49 0 1 
Insider-outside balance .48 .5 0 1 
Size of state 2.99 1.95 .55 8.74 
Ticket-balancing 
theory 
Current rival .14 .34 0 1 
State competitiveness 12.12 12.95 0 95 
Ambition .41 .5 0 1 
Media exposure 1.71 1.33 -.98 5.18 
Political experience 2.66 .66 0 3.85 
Education .79 .41 0 1 
Age 53.40 7.76 32 76 
 
Theory of 
increased 
complexity 
 
Military service .51 .50 0 1 
Political experience pre-1976 1.19 1.37 0 3.85 
Political experience post-1972 1.47 1.45 0 3.64 
Size of state pre-1976 1.34 1.90 0 8.37 
Size of state post-1972 1.65 2.15 0 8.74 
Regional balance pre-1976 .42 .49 0 1 
Theory of changed 
dynamics 
Regional balance post-1972 .44 .5 0 1 
N=168, no missing values 
 
6.1.1  Dependent variable 
For binary variables, the mean and the standard deviation do not have the same meaning as 
for continuum-based variables. However, the mean of a dummy variable gives information 
about the proportion of units that are assigned the value 1 (Midtbø 2007: 44). For the 
dependent variable of this application, vice presidential selection, that means that 16% of the 
finalists were the first choices for the position of vice president. 
 
6.1.2 The ticket-balancing theory 
Like the dependent variable, all but one of the independent variables linked to the ticket-
balancing theory are dummy variables. The means of ideological balance, religious balance, 
age balance and insider-outsider balance all indicate a fairly even distribution between the 
non-balanced and balanced tickets. In contrast, the units of regional balance, demographic 
balance and current rival are not so evenly distributed. These variables’ means show that 
whilst an entire 86% of the vice presidential finalist are from a different geographical region 
than the presidential nominee, just 8% of the finalist are of a different race or gender than the 
nominee and only 14% of the finalists challenged the presidential candidate for nomination.  
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The only metric variable in the ticket-balancing theory is the size of state variable. Its 
minimum value is .55. This percentage score corresponds to states that have 3 electoral votes 
out of the national total of 538 (like for example Sarah Palin’s Alaska in 2008). The 
maximum value is 8.74, corresponding to California’s 47 votes in 1988.  
 
6.1.3 The theory of increased complexity 
There are three dummy variables pertaining to this theory. First, the mean of ambition 
indicate that 41% of the finalists have competed for the vice presidency or the presidency in 
previous election cycles. Second, the mean of military service signifies that 51% of the 
finalists have served in the military. Last, the mean of education shows that 79% of the 
finalists have higher education of more than four years. 
 
In terms of variable range, state competitiveness must be commented upon. The maximum 
value is remarkably high and represents extreme circumstances: The Democratic finalist 
James F. Byrnes from South Carolina scored 95 on the variable in 1944. That is explained by 
the extreme Democratic support in South Carolina in the three preceding state elections: 
Theodore Roosevelt won by 96 %, 97 % and 91 %. Obviously, such election results can 
hardly be considered the norm. The variable’s mean of 12.12 and standard deviation of 12.95 
signifies that Byrnes in 1944 is an exception, and that most finalists score considerably closer 
to the minimum value of 0 than to the maximum value of 95. 
 
Political experience also has a skewed distribution. It ranges from a minimum value of 0 to a 
maximum value of 3.85. Thus, the mean of 2.66 and the standard deviation of .66 show that 
the majority of the finalist are assigned values at the higher end of the scale. Still, this is 
perhaps not surprising considering the non-linear coding of the variable, taking the log of the 
finalists’ years in public office. 
 
Media exposure is a standardized measure and its values are not intuitively translatable into 
precise quantities (i.e. number of newspaper articles). Consequently, the variable’s range from 
-.98 to 5.18 are vital in providing a reference frame for the interpretation of the variable. First, 
it provides a clue of the substantive meaning of the variable’s values. Take Sarah Palin’s 
score of -.94 as an example: Though not being indicative of the accurate number of articles 
written about her, it shows that she is one of the finalists in the dataset that had the lowest 
level of media coverage (prior to her nomination).  
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Second, since the odds ratio (which will be discussed in the upcoming analysis) is based upon 
the notion of a unit increase in a variable, it helps to have an understanding of the distance 
between the units. Seeing as media exposure ranges from almost -1 to just above 5, one can 
fruitfully think of the variable as a six-point scale. Following that simplification, the 
difference between Joe Biden and Sarah Palin can be illustrative of a unit increase, since 
Biden had a score of about 0 and Palin had a score of nearly -1. However, in real terms, the 
difference between the two is not necessarily great. It is mainly caused by the fact that Time 
Magazine wrote one article on Biden, whilst none on Palin, in the period from January 1st 
2007 to June 30th 2008. Thus, the distance between the units on the variable can be considered 
relatively small. 
 
Last among the variables linked to this theory is age. This variable’s minimum value reveals 
that the youngest finalist (Robert Kennedy in the Democratic pool of 1964) was 32 years old 
when he was considered for vice president 36 . The maximum value, on the other hand, 
indicates that the oldest finalist was 76 years old (Alben Barkley in the 1956 Democratic 
pool). The average age of the finalists is 53.4 and the standard deviation of 7.76 furthermore 
shows that most of the finalists were in the ages between 46 and 62.  
 
6.1.4  Theory of changed dynamics 
All the variables that are comprised in the theory of changed dynamics are marked by the 
division between the period before 1976 and after 1972. That the variables are coded 0 on 
either side of this demarcation line is reflected in the mean and standard deviation of all the 
variables. Take the two dummy variables regional balance pre-1976 and regional balance 
post-1972 as an illustration: The original dummy variable regional balance consisted almost 
exclusively of 1’s, whilst the means of the two modified variables are both close to .5. The 
same can be seen for the remaining four metric variables: The ranges of the modified 
variables size of state pre-1976/size of state post-1972 and political experience pre-
1976/political experience post-1972 are pretty close to the ranges of the original variables size 
of state and political experience, but the means of the modified variables are obviously 
considerably lower than the means of the original variables. 
                                                 
36
 It should be mentioned that Robert Kennedy’s age of 32 would probably have been an issue if he was selected: 
According to Article II in the Constitution, the president must be at least 35 years. If he was vice president, 
Kennedy would thus have been effectively prevented from succeeding take the presidency. 
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6.2 DESCRIPTIVE EXPLORATION OF WITHIN-GROUP VARIANCE 
As noted in the methods chapter, conditional logistic regression has a specific requirement for 
the distribution of the independent variables: They should have variance within the selection 
pools, as little within-group variance would potentially yield biased results. Consequently, a 
descriptive exploration of the independent variables’ distribution within the selection pools is 
imperative. 
 
To begin with, nine of the variables are metric37. One should thus reasonably expect these 
variables to vary within the selection pools, more so than the dummy variables. A quick 
glance at the dataset confirms that expectation: There is considerable variance in nearly all 
selection pools38.In contrast, the dummy variables warrant greater scrutiny. Table 6.2 gives an 
overview of the variance within the selection pools for each variable. Also, it provides 
information of the values of these non-variant selection pools.  
 
Table 6.2 Within-group variance for the dummy variables 
Values of the non-
variant selection pools 
 Pools without 
variance 
Total number 
of pools  
Percentage of 
pools without 
variance Only 0 Only 1 
Regional balance 13 27 48.1 13 - 
Religious balance 9 27 33.3 2 7 
Ideological balance 0 27 0 - - 
Demographic balance 21 27 77.8 21 - 
Age balance 6 27 22.2 3 3 
Insider-outsider balance 12 27 44.4 4 8 
Current rival 12 27 44.4 - 12 
Ambition 2 27 7.4 1 1 
Education 9 27 33.3 - 9 
Military service 6 27 22.2 3 3 
Regional balance pre-1976 11 14 78.6 - 11 
Regional balance post-1972 3 13 23.1 - 3 
 
The table shows that two variables in particular that have alarmingly high percentages of 
selection pools without variance: Demographic balance and regional balance pre-1976. 
 
Firstly, the demographic balance variable has constant values in 21 of 27 selection pools and 
all the units of observation in these selection pools are coded 0. In practice, that means that in 
almost 80 % of the vice presidential selections, candidates of a different gender or ethnicity 
                                                 
37
 The metric variables are the following: Media exposure, state competitiveness, age, the three variables 
measuring size of state (size of state, size of state pre-1976 and size of state post-1972) and the three variables 
measuring political experience (political experience, political experience pre-1976 and political experience post-
1972). 
38
 Excluding the selection pools that are deliberately set to 0 in the variables size of state pre-1976, size of state 
post-1972, political experience pre-1976 and political experience post-1972. 
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than the presidential nominees were not even put on the shortlist. Such a systematic pattern 
inevitably tempts a conclusion that the lack of demographic balance in fact was desirable for 
the presidential nominees, that the presidential nominees have generally not wanted a running 
mate of a different gender or ethnic background. If that is the case, the real effect of the 
demographic balance variable is negative in 21 of the 27 selection pools. Since that will not 
be captured by a conditional logistic regression analysis, the variable may have an inherent 
positive bias. 
 
Therefore, in order to include demographic balance in the analysis, the interpretation of the 
variable’s estimated effect will be subject to reservations. Instead of claiming overall 
generalizability, there is rather the potential of making conditional inferences. To exemplify: 
If the demographic balance variable has a positive effect in the analysis, one cannot 
automatically conclude that male presidential nominees generally pick female running mates 
or running mates of a different race. Rather, the conclusion would be that if a male 
presidential nominee considers a woman seriously enough to include her on his shortlist, she 
has good chances of being chosen in that specific selection. As such, the ticket-balancing 
theory’s expectation in hypothesis H4 (that demographic balance would have a positive effect 
on vice presidential selections) can only be conditionally supported in the upcoming analyses.    
 
Secondly, regional balance pre-1976 has a problematically low level of within-group 
variance. Only three of the fourteen selection pools between 1940 and 1972 have varying 
values. The distribution pattern is, however, the opposite of the demographic balance variable: 
The eleven non-variant selection pools solely contain units of observations that are coded 1 
and thereby represent regionally balanced tickets. Following the logic discussed above, that 
implies that one cannot disregard the possibility that these vice presidential finalists were all 
selected because of their capacity to balance the ticket geographically. Potentially, the 
variable may have a negative bias: The conditional logistic analysis might not capture the true 
positive effect of the variable. Thus, by the same logic that was discussed for the demographic 
balance variable, the generalizability of the variable is drawn into question. However, the 
direction of the potential bias is the opposite of the demographic balance variable. 
 
For the rest of the variables, the level of within-group variance is deemed acceptable. The 
conclusion is therefore that only the two variables measuring demographic balance and 
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regional balance pre-1976 require particular attention when interpreting the results of the 
models below.  
 
6.3 MODEL 1: THE TICKET-BALANCING THEORY 
The ticket-balancing theory is the first to be tested in a conditional logistic regression model. 
There are eight hypotheses related to the theory, H1-H8. These hypotheses postulate that the 
six balancing variables, as well as the variables measuring size of state and presidential rivalry 
will have positive and significant effects on the vice presidential selections. 
 
Table 6.3 Model 1: The ticket-balancing model 
Characteristics of potential 
candidate or ticket 
Logit 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
P-value Odds ratio  
Regional balance -.08  .72  .909  .92 
Ideological balance  .02  .44  .960 1.02 
Religious balance -.51  .58  .374  .60 
Demographic balance  .72 1.11  .515 2.06 
Age balance  .49  .50  .325 1.64 
Insider-outsider balance -1.04  .68  .121  .35 
Current rival  .64  .72  .343  .50 
Size of state  .22  .12  .069* 1.24 
Model fit     
Chi2 (8) 8.23    
Prob > chi2 .411    
Adjusted McFaddens’ R2 -0.082    
BIC 23.73    
Perccentage of corrent predictions (12/27) 44.4%    
* p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01                 All significance tests are two-tailed 
N= 168 
 
 
Table 6.1 demonstrates weak results for the ticket-balancing theory in model 1. First, a look at 
the variables’ effects: Neither of the balancing variables nor the current rival variable have 
statistically significant effects. That statement holds even after excluding several of the 
variables randomly. No combination of variables makes any of the balancing variables have 
significant effects, not even the insider-outsider balance (which in model 1 has a p-value that 
is just above .10). Hence, there is little support for any of the hypotheses H1-H6, which 
postulated balanced tickets to have positive effect on the vice presidential selection. Also, 
hypothesis H7 is left unsupported by the analysis: Rivalry for the presidential nomination 
does not appear to increase the finalist’s chances of becoming selected as vice president. 
 
Only size of state performs in accordance with the theoretical expectations. The effect of this 
variable is significant, positive and substantive: The odds ratio shows that a unit increase in 
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the variable would increase the odds of selection by 1.24, all other variables held constant. 
Since the variable is the state’s proportion of the national total electoral votes, the odds ratio 
means that if Sarah Palin had moved from Alaska (with three votes) to South Carolina (with 
eight votes), her odds of being selected in 2008 would have increased by 24 %. The analysis 
therefore finds support for hypothesis H8, expecting a positive effect of size of state. 
 
Also, in terms of model fit, model 1 performs poorly. The likelihood ratio test (denoted Chi2) 
is statistically insignificant, meaning that the performance of the ticket-balancing model is no 
better than mere chance. Also, the adjusted McFadden’s R2 is negative. Though this is a 
relative measure, a negative value should safely be interpreted as a poor fit. The model is 
clearly penalized for including too many inefficient predictors, i.e. variables without 
significant effects.  
 
Lastly, model 1 only predicted 12 of the 27 selection pool winners, corresponding to a 
percentage of correctly predicted cases of 44.1 %. A tabulation of the hits and misses is 
presented below.  
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Table 6.4 Correctly predicted cases in model 1 
Year Selection pool winner Correctly predicted 
1940 (D) Hull, Cordell X 
1944 (D) Truman, Harry  
1944 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1948 (D) Douglas, William O. X 
1948 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1952 (D) Sparkman, John X 
1952 (R) Nixon, Richard  
1960 (D) Johnson, Lyndon B.  
1960 (R) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1964 (D) Humphrey, Hubert  
1964 (R) Miller, William X 
1968 (D) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1968 (R) Finch, Robert X 
1972 (D) Kennedy, Edward  
1976 (D) Mondale, Walter  
1976 (R) Dole, Robert  
1980 (R) Ford, Gerald  
1984 (D) Ferraro, Geraldine  
1988 (D) Bentsen, Lloyd X 
1988 (R) Quayle, Dan X 
1992 (D) Gore, Al  
1996 (R) Kemp, Jack X 
2000 (D) Lieberman, Joe  
2000 (R) Cheney, Dick  
2004 (D) McCain, John  
2008 (D) Biden, Joe  
2008 (R) Palin, Sarah  
 Total 12 
 
 
The table shows that a certain decrease in correct predictions over time is observable. The 
model predicts the right winner in nine of the thirteen first selection pools from 1940 to 1964, 
while not having a single correct prediction in the selection pools of the 21st century. This can 
give rise speculations that the model’s predictive capacity has declined over the decades, 
though the number of selection pools is not enough for such a conclusion to be posited with 
sufficient certainty. 
 
On the other hand, what can safely be concluded is that the conditional regression analysis 
conducted in model 1 gives little merit to the ticket-balancing theory, as the model has an 
overall poor fit to the empirical data. Furthermore, it shows that presidential nominees have 
selected their running mates neither because they balanced the ticket nor rivaled them for their 
presidential nomination in the current general election. Out of the traditional variables linked 
to the ticket-balancing theory, only the size of state variable had a positive and statistically 
significant effect. 
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6.4 MODEL 2: THE THEORY OF INCREASED COMPLEXITY 
Model 2, which tests the theory of increased complexity, include seven of the eight traditional 
variables that were also incorporated in model 1, the exception being age balance 39 . 
Accordingly, the model of increased complexity provides another test of the seven 
corresponding hypotheses H1-H5, H7 and H8.  
 
Also, model 2 provides a test of the hypotheses H9-H15. These six hypotheses postulate that a 
set of modern explanatory variables will influence the selections: Five of the variables are 
expected to influence the selections positively, whilst age are expected to have a negative 
effect in the analyses. 
 
Table 6.5 Model 2: Model of increased complexity 
Characteristics of potential ticket Logit 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
P-value Odds ratio 
Modern selection variables 
State competitiveness 
 
 .02 
 
 .02 
 
.296 
 
1.02 
Ambition 1.37  .61  .024** 3.94 
Media exposure  .83  .28  .003*** 2.30 
Political experience 1.29  .65  .047** 3.63 
Education  .58  .77  .453 1.78 
Age -.12  .05  .014** 0.89 
Military service 1.04  .70  .234 2.81 
Traditional variables 
Regional balance 
 
 .14 
 
 .86 
 
.871 
 
1.15 
Ideological balance -.69  .58  
.232  .50 
Religious balance -.28  .71  .695  .76 
Demographical balance 2.47 1.38  .074* 11.87 
Insider-outsider balance  -.67  .81  .408  .52 
Current rival -2.93 1.15  .011**  .05 
Size of state  .26  .15  .082* 1.30 
Model fit     
Chi2 (14) 30.64    
Prob > chi2       .006***    
Adjusted McFaddens’ R2 .028    
BIC 21.09    
Percentage of correct predictions (16/27) 59.2 %    
* p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01                 All significance tests are two-tailed 
N= 168 
 
The table shows that four of the modern selection variables have statistically significant 
effects, and that these all perform in the expected direction. Firstly, there is the ambition 
variable. This has a positive effect in the model, thus supporting hypothesis H10. The odds 
ratio further suggests that the effect of ambition is large: The odds of a finalist being selected 
would be almost four times bigger if the finalist had been considered for the vice presidency 
                                                 
39
 See chapter 3, section 3.3. 
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or competed for the presidency, and thus scored 1 instead of 0 on that variable. That 
corresponds to an increase of almost 300 % in the odds for selection, all other variables held 
constant.  
 
Furthermore, the results show that media exposure raises the chances of a finalist being 
selected as vice president, thus supporting hypothesis H11. The odds ratio of the variable tells 
that the odds for selection will increase by a factor of 2.3 in the odds for selection per unit 
increase. Following the discussion of section 6.1, a unit increase in media exposure 
corresponds to the score of Palin versus the score of Biden on the variable. Thus, if Palin was 
equally profiled in the media as Biden was prior to the selection in 2008, her odds of being 
nominated would have increased by 130 %. Since the difference between Palin and Biden was 
not very large in terms of number of articles written about them, an odds ratio of that 
magnitude is clearly indicative of a large effect.  
 
Thirdly, the model shows that, in accordance with hypothesis H12, political experience 
influences the selection positively. In this case too, the odds ratio indicates a substantial effect: 
A unit increase in the variable means an increase in the odds for selection by a factor of 3.63, 
holding all other variables constant. That corresponds to a percentage increase of over 250 %. 
However, when making that statement, the substantive meaning of a unit increase in the 
variable should again be described: Since the variable is based on a logarithmic 
transformation of the finalists’ years of experience, a unit increase from 0 to 1 would 
correspond to fewer years in public office than would an increase from 2 to 3.  
 
Fourthly, age has a negative effect. Thus, it complies with the expectation in H14 that 
presidential nominees tend to select running mates that add youth to the ticket. The odds ratio 
of .89 (a decrease of about 11%) may give a misleading impression of a small effect, 
especially when compared to the magnitudes of the odds ratios of the three explanatory 
variables above40. However, in interpreting that odds ratio, one must bear in mind that the 
variable range stretches over 44 years (units). It is hence a plausible argument that the 
distance between these units is qualitatively smaller than the distance between the units of a 
dummy. In a comparison, the age variable’s units can be viewed more as matters of degree 
                                                 
40
 Generally, the size of negative odds ratios should not be directly compared to positive odds ratio, due to the 
inverse relationship between them. In this case, however, the comparison is justified: The negative factor change 
of .89 (=1/1.12) has about the same magnitude as a positive factor change of 1.12 (an 11% decrease versus a 
12% increase).  
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than absolutes, whilst it would be the other way around for the units of a dummy, such as for 
example ambition. Consequently, one cannot measure the change in odds of a one-year 
increase in age against the same standards as a one-unit increase in the ambition dummy. 
Instead, one must lower the expectations about the odds ratio of age, and following this, an 
odds ratio of .89 should not be dismissed as unsubstantial. 
 
None of the other modern variables (state competitiveness, education and military service) 
have statistically significant effects. Thus, the hypotheses H9, H13 and H15, all expecting the 
variables to have positively influence the chance of vice presidential selection, are not 
supported by the model.  
 
In terms of the traditional variables, model 2 does not fully comply with the tendencies that 
were demonstrated in model 1. Two of the variables that were statistically insignificant in 
model 1, demographic balance and current rival, have statistically significant effects in 
model 2. This inter-model inconsistency unavoidably provides mixed evidence for the 
respective hypotheses H4 and H7.  
 
Furthermore, the demographic balance was one of the variables that were problematized 
above due to its low level of within-group variance and potential positive bias. Keeping this in 
mind, the extreme magnitude of the variable’s positive effect should appear suspect: The odds 
ratio shows that a finalist of a different gender/race than the presidential nominee has 12 times 
greater odds of being selected than a finalist of the same gender and race, all variables held 
equal. Yet, as discussed in section 6.2, a conditional inference can be made: If the presidential 
nominee actually considers a finalist that balances the ticket demographically (to the point 
where the finalist is added to the shortlist), the chances of that finalists being selected would 
be very high. In turn, this indicates that demographically balanced tickets do not just 
randomly occur. One can speculate that the selections of the demographically balancing 
finalists are the results of conscious choices largely because of their gender or ethnic 
background.  
 
The current rival variable, on the other hand, is not subject to similar reservations of lack of 
variance. Model 2 shows that rivalry for the presidential nomination in the current election 
cycle lowers a finalist’s chances of receiving the vice presidential nod. The magnitude of this 
variable’s negative effect can be considered extreme: The odds ratio is .05. That corresponds 
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to a decrease of 95 % in the odds of selections if a finalist was a rival for the presidential 
nomination. And because negative odds ratios are in an inverse relationship to positive ones, 
the factor change of .05 is size-wise equivalent to a positive factor change of 20. Current rival 
is consequently the dummy variable in both models 1 and 2 with the largest effect. Hypothesis 
H7, which found no support in model 1, is further weakened by model 2: Presidential rivalry 
in the current election cycle does not appear to increase the finalists’ likelihood of selection. 
Rather, it would contribute heavily to the finalist not being selected. 
  
Lastly, the final significant variable in model 2’s bulk of traditional variables, size of state, 
complies with the findings in model 1. The effect is approximately the same size, with an 
odds ratio of 1.3 compared to 1.24 in model 1. Thus, hypothesis H8 is further strengthened by 
model 2: Size of state appears to have a positive effect on the finalist’s chance of being 
selected.  
 
In sum, an inspection of the variables’ effects in model 2 demonstrates that four out of seven 
modern selection variables comply with the expectations of the theory of increased 
complexity: According to the model, presidential nominees tend to select running mates that 1) 
add youth to the ticket, 2) have political ambitions, 3) are highly profiled in the media and 4) 
are experienced in politics. Also, three of the traditional variables have significant effects. 
Size of state and demographic balance have positive effects and perform in line with the 
theoretical expectations, albeit the latter only conditionally. Current rival, on the other hand, 
deviates from the theory by having a negative effect on the vice presidential selection. Thus, 
the presidential nominees also select running mates that 5) come from a populous state, 6) 
have made it to the shortlist despite being of a different gender or race than the presidential 
nominee and 7) have not rivaled them for the presidential nomination. 
 
In terms of overall fit, model 2 performs better than model 1. Unlike model 1, the likelihood 
ratio test shows that model 2 is statistically significantly better than a null model. Furthermore, 
model 2’s adjusted McFadden’s R2 and the BIC also offer improvements from model 1, the 
former moving from a negative to a positive value and the latter measure decreasing by two 
units. Yet, following the guidelines presented in chapter 4, a two-unit decrease in BIC is only 
indicative of a minor improvement. Therefore, the evidence that favors model 2 to model 1 
can be characterized as weak. In this respect, it should be recalled that both the BIC and the 
adjusted McFadden’s R2 penalizes models that includes inefficient variables. Model 2, 
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comprising 7 variables that have statistically insignificant effects, can undoubtedly fall within 
that category. This may help explain why model 2 is only slightly preferable to model 1 when 
it comes to model fit. 
 
Finally, the model correctly predicts 59.2 % of the selection pool winners, representing an 
increase of 4 correct predictions from model 1. An overview of the correct and failed 
predictions is presented below. 
 
Table 6.6 Correctly predicted cases in model 2 
Year Selection pool winner Correctly predicted 
1940 (D) Hull, Cordell X 
1944 (D) Truman, Harry  
1944 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1948 (D) Douglas, William O.  
1948 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1952 (D) Sparkman, John  
1952 (R) Nixon, Richard  
1960 (D) Johnson, Lyndon B. X 
1960 (R) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1964 (D) Humphrey, Hubert X 
1964 (R) Miller, William  
1968 (D) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1968 (R) Finch, Robert  
1972 (D) Kennedy, Edward X 
1976 (D) Mondale, Walter X 
1976 (R) Dole, Robert  
1980 (R) Ford, Gerald X 
1984 (D) Ferraro, Geraldine  
1988 (D) Bentsen, Lloyd X 
1988 (R) Quayle, Dan X 
1992 (D) Gore, Al X 
1996 (R) Kemp, Jack X 
2000 (D) Lieberman, Joe  
2000 (R) Cheney, Dick  
2004 (D) McCain, John X 
2008 (D) Biden, Joe  
2008 (R) Palin, Sarah X 
 Total 16 
 
 
The table shows that the model’s predictive capacity applies to both parties and all decades 
(except in the two selection pools in 1952, in which the model missed). Compared to model 1, 
model 2 is thus observably better at predicting selection pool winners correctly in the most 
recent decades. Whilst model 1 only has one correct prediction after 1988, model 2 has four: 
It correctly predicts the winners in the 2004 Democratic pool and the 2008 Republican pool, 
as well as both pools in the 1990’s.  
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The measures of model fit (and predictive capacity) thus confirm the impression given by the 
examination of the effect of the variables: Model 2 has an overall better performance than 
model 1. Yet, considering that model 1’s score on these measures could be characterized as 
very poor (for example by the likelihood ratio test not being statistically significant), it should 
be noted that the improvement represented by model 2 is by no means dramatic. The fit of 
model 2 would surely benefit from removing some of the inefficient predictors (this will be 
done later in the synthesis model). 
 
6.5 MODEL 3: THE THEORY OF CHANGED DYNAMICS 
There are three explicit hypotheses that are deduced from the theory of changed dynamics. 
H16 and H17 postulates that the traditional variables regional balance and size of state will 
have a positive effect only before 1976, whilst H18 expects political experience to have a 
positive effect only after 1972. Thus, the hypotheses also contain an inherent expectation 
regarding the “opposite” variables (regional balance post-1972, size of state post-1972 and 
political experience pre-1976): These variables are presumed to have statistically insignificant, 
unsubstantial or even negative effects on the vice presidential selections. Consequently, for 
the hypotheses to be supported by the analysis, both the two time-demarcated variables must 
be taken into account: The hypotheses would only be confirmed if the variables have different 
effects. 
 
Table 6.7 Model 3: Model of changed dynamics 
Characteristics of potential ticket Logit coefficient Standard error P-value Odds ratio 
Political experience pre-1976 -.32  .51  .529  .73 
Political experience post-1972  .54  .59  .361 1.71 
Size of state pre-1976 1.09  .43  .011** 2.97 
Size of state post-1972 -.09  .17  .607  .92 
Regional balance pre-1976 2.08 1.78  .243 8.01 
Regional balance post-1972  .19  .86  .821 1.22 
Model Fit     
Chi2 (6) 18.98    
Prob > chi2        .004***    
Adjusted McFadden’s R2 0.074    
BIC 6.39    
Percentage of correct predictions (14/27) 51.8    
* p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01                 All significance tests are two-tailed 
N= 168 
 
Table 6.7 shows that the only variable in model 3 to have a statistically significant effect is 
size of state pre-1976. The effect is positive and also substantive. All other variables held 
constant, a unit increase in the variable (moving for example from a state with 3 electoral 
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votes to a state of 8 electoral votes) would correspond to a factor change of almost 3 in the 
odds for selection. This factor change is more than twice the size of the unmodified time-
constant variable size of state in model 1 and 2. That the effect is larger when limited to the 
period of 1940-1972 than for the entire period as a whole could arguably be interpreted in 
favor of the theory of changed dynamics. 
 
Also, the “opposite” variable size of state post-1972 has a statistically insignificant effect in 
the negative direction. Combined, the pre-1976 and post-1972 variables therefore represent 
strong support for hypothesis H17, which expects the positive effect of size of state to only 
take place in the period before 1976. Logically, that also contests the premise of hypothesis 
H8, which postulated that the effect of size of state is constant across the whole period 1940-
2008 (and found support in models 1 and 2).  
 
With regards to the other variables, there is no equivalent compliance with the theoretical 
expectations. First, the political experience variables: Though both variables have effects in 
directions that fit the theory (positive after 1972 and negative before 1976), the effects are not 
statistically significant. To verify that this result is not affected by the variables’ internal 
correlation, the model is replicated twice, each time excluding one of the variables (see 
Appendix) 41. That the variables have statistically insignificant effects in all the models thus 
increases the reliability of the result: Hypothesis H18 is not substantiated, as political 
experience does not have a positive effect on the vice presidential selections - in any of the 
two periods. 
 
Second, the regional balance pre-1976 and post-1972 variables also have insignificant effects, 
and H16 is thus not supported. However, a note of caution must be included. Due to an 
extremely low level of within-group variance in the pre-1976 variable (see section 6.2), it is 
possible that this variable has a negative bias and does not fully capture the “true” positive 
effect of regional balance before 1976. Nevertheless, though this means that the variable 
estimate’s reliability is somewhat drawn into question, the interpretation of the model is still 
unambiguous. It shows no observable significant difference in the selection of regionally 
balancing finalists between the different sides of the 1972/1976 demarcation line.  
 
                                                 
41
 See chapter 5, section 5.4.3, for discussion of these variables’ intercorrelation.  
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In terms of model fit, model 3 performs well compared to the other two models.  Firstly, the 
likelihood ratio test of the model is statistically significant. Secondly, the relative measures of 
model fit represent an improvement from model 2. The adjusted McFadden’s R2 has increased 
and (more dramatically) the BIC value has decreased by an entire 14 units. A difference of 
that magnitude is characterized as very strong evidence in favor of the latter model. Still, it 
must again be noted that since BIC and McFadden’s R2 are both variable-sensitive measures, 
and model 3 therefore benefits from being more parsimonious than model 2 (including only 
six variables compared to model 2’s fourteen). 
 
When it comes to generating correct predictions, model 3’s performance is slightly inferior to 
that of model 2. It has 14 correct predictions, corresponding to a percentage of correct 
predictions of 51.8. This places model 3 in between the two former models, having two more 
correct predictions than model 1 and two fewer correct predictions than model 2.  
 
Table 6.8 Correctly predicted cases in model 3 
Year Selection pool winner Correctly predicted 
1940 (D) Hull, Cordell  
1944 (D) Truman, Harry X 
1944 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1948 (D) Douglas, William O.  
1948 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1952 (D) Sparkman, John  
1952 (R) Nixon, Richard X 
1960 (D) Johnson, Lyndon B. X 
1960 (R) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1964 (D) Humphrey, Hubert  
1964 (R) Miller, William X 
1968 (D) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1968 (R) Finch, Robert X 
1972 (D) Kennedy, Edward  
1976 (D) Mondale, Walter  
1976 (R) Dole, Robert X 
1980 (R) Ford, Gerald X 
1984 (D) Ferraro, Geraldine  
1988 (D) Bentsen, Lloyd  
1988 (R) Quayle, Dan  
1992 (D) Gore, Al  
1996 (R) Kemp, Jack  
2000 (D) Lieberman, Joe X 
2000 (R) Cheney, Dick X 
2004 (D) McCain, John  
2008 (D) Biden, Joe X 
2008 (R) Palin, Sarah  
 Total 14 
 
 
Examining the table closely, there is a detectable difference between predictions in the two 
party camps. The model has correctly predicted 9 out of 12 Republican selections, whilst only 
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5 out of 15 Democratic selections. The predictive capacity of model 3 thus seems to apply 
more to Republican vice presidential picks than Democratic ones. The predictive capacity 
over time, on the other hand, seems to be rather constant: The only notable tendency in this 
respect is a “gap” in successes after 1980 up to 2000, where the model missed all five 
selection pools. This time period also represents the strongest deviation from model 2, which 
comparatively had correct predictions in four out of these five selection pools.  
 
All in all, however, the performance of model 3 is very decent. There is a difference in the 
dynamics of the vice presidential selections between the periods before and after 1976/1972 
with regards to the effect of the finalists’ home states’ sizes. Though no such difference is 
observable when it comes to political experience and regional balance, the model still has an 
overall better fit than the other two models. 
  
6.6 MODEL COMPARISON 
In a summarizing comparison of the three models, model 1 is by far the one with the lowest 
overall model fit, not even being statistically significant overall. Model 2 faired better, whilst 
model 3 represented the most substantial improvement in model fit from both the other 
models.  
 
Though producing correct predictions is a less important goal for the models (see chapter 4, 
page 35), it can still be noted that model 1 has the weakest performance also on this measure, 
but that the internal ranking between model 2 and model 3 is reversed: Model 2 has the 
highest percentage of correctly predicted selection pool winners. Also, it is perhaps a notable 
peculiarity that though the model’s prediction success patterns are diverse, one selection pool 
stands out as being especially unpredictable: Neither of the models was able to predict 
Geraldine Ferraro as the winner of the 1984 Democratic selection.  
 
When it comes to the different independent variables, all three models include variables that 
comply with the theoretical expectations. Model 1, testing the ticket-balancing theory, 
demonstrates that size of state has a statistically significant and positive effect on the vice 
presidential selections. Model 2 shows that four of the modern selection variables (ambition, 
media exposure, political experience and age) have effects in accordance with the theory of 
increased complexity. It also demonstrated that two of the traditional variables (size of state 
and demographic balance) were in line with both the first two theories, albeit the latter 
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variable only conditionally. Lastly, model 3 demonstrates that the performance of the 
interrelated variables size of state pre-1976 and size of state post-1972 is in line with theory of 
changed dynamics.  
 
All the theories thus demonstrate some compliance with the empirical data in the models. Yet, 
none of them fully hit the mark. Few of the ticket-balancing variables complied with the 
theoretical expectations, some of the modern selection criteria introduced by the theory of 
increased complexity had no explanatory power and, finally, the threshold of temporal change 
postulated by the theory of changed dynamics is only found to apply to the size of state 
variable. 
 
Thus, the overall conclusion is that though the theory of increased complexity and the theory 
of changed dynamics explain vice presidential selection better than the ticket-balancing theory, 
there is certainly room for improvement in terms of model construction. In that vein, the 
thesis proposes a synthesis model, combining the most efficient explanatory theoretical 
features. This model aims to represent a better (and more parsimonious) explanation for vice 
presidential selections of the whole period 1940-2008. 
 
6.7 STEP-WISE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SYNTHESIS MODEL  
Searching to present the best explanatory model of the historical vice presidential selections, 
the synthesis model will include the variables that have demonstrated explanatory efficiency 
in the three former models, regardless of their theoretical affiliation. The table below gives a 
complete overview of variables that meet this criterion. 
 
Table 6.9 Overview of variables with significant effects in models 1, 2 and 3 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Variable Significant Direction Significant Direction Significant Direction 
H4 Demographic balance No Positive Yes Positive - - 
H7 Current rival No Negative Yes Negative - - 
H8 Size of state Yes Positive Yes Positive - - 
H10 Ambition - - Yes Positive - - 
H11 Media exposure - - Yes Positive - - 
H12 Political experience - - Yes Positive - - 
H14 Age - - Yes Negative - - 
Size of state pre-1976 - - - - Yes Positive H17 Size of state post-1972 - - - - No Negative 
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The table includes nine different explanatory variables. Six of them, demographic balance, 
current rival, ambition, media exposure, political experience and age, can be included in the 
synthesis model without hesitation. However, the three remaining variables are more 
problematic. They represent theories/hypotheses based on irreconcilable premises and cannot 
be included in the same model. The synthesis model must inevitably choose between the 
traditional variable measuring size of state and the modified variables measuring size of state 
post-1972 and size of state pre-1976.  
 
Faced with this choice, it should be remarked that the findings presented thus far in the 
chapter can be interpreted in favor of the latter pair of time-demarcated variables. The reason 
is two-fold. First, the model testing the theory of changed dynamics clearly outperforms the 
model testing the ticket-balancing theory in terms of model fit and predictive success. Second, 
though the effects of the variables cannot be directly compared across the different models, 
one should still note the difference in odds ratio between the size of state variable in model 1 
and 2 and size of state pre-1976 in model 3. That the latter variable by far has the largest odds 
ratio indicates that this is more efficient in explaining the vice presidential selections, 
especially considering the statistical insignificance of the size of state post-1972.   
 
Nevertheless, the two alternative choices of variable(s) can be evaluated statistically. 
Specifically, two likelihood-ratios test can be conducted. First, a synthesis model is 
constructed both with and without the un-modified size of state variable. The likelihood ratio 
test thus determines whether the added variable significantly improve the model’s explanatory 
power. Second, the synthesis model is constructed with and without the modified variables 
size of state pre-1976 and size of state post-1972 and the synthesis model tests whether these 
variables jointly represent an improvement to the model fit. The results of the tests are 
tabulated below. 
 
Table 6.10 Likelihood ratio tests of alternative variables’ contribution to model 4 
Variable(s) Size of state Size of state pre-1976 Size of state post -1972 
Chi2 2.18 11.33 
Degrees of freedom 1 2 
Prob > chi2 .140        .004*** 
* p<  .10 **.p< .05 ***.p< .01           
 
The two likelihood ratio tests demonstrate that only the two variables size of state pre-1976 
and post-1972 offer a significant improvement of the synthesis model’s fit. This has obvious 
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implication for the construction of the synthesis model. It includes the two time-demarcated 
variables instead of the time-constant size of state.  As such, hypothesis H8, postulating size 
of state to have a positive effect on the entire period of vice presidential selections, is rejected. 
Instead, hypothesis H17, expecting the positive effect of size of state to be limited to the 
period before 1976, is preferred.  
 
In turn, that implies that model 4 incorporates elements both from the theory of increased 
complexity and the theory of changed dynamics. The ticket-balancing theory must be seen as 
playing a subordinate role, included only indirectly as parts of the other two theories.  
 
6.7.1 Model 4: Synthesis model – version 1 
Table 6.11 Model 4: The synthesis model 
Characteristics of potential 
ticket 
Logit 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
P-value Odds ratio 
Traditional variables 
Current rival -3.28 1.32  .013**  .04 
Demographic balance 1.81 1.07  .090* 6.13 
Modern variables 
Ambition 1.38  .61  .023** 3.96 
Media exposure 
 .64  .26  .013** 1.91 
Political experience 
 .88  .65  .176 2.42 
Age 
-.07  .05  .162  .93 
Time-demarcated variables 
Size of state pre-1976 .86  .33  .009*** 2.35 
Size of state post-1972 
-.13  .21  .523  .88 
Model Fit     
Chi2 (8) 34.17    
Prob > chi2        .000***    
Adjusted McFadden’s R2 .192    
BIC -2.21    
Percentage of correct predictions (15/27)  55.6 %    
* p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01                 All significance tests are two-tailed 
N= 168 
 
The table shows that model 4 has statistical merit. Most of the variables have statistically 
significant effects that comply with the theoretical expectations. Only three variables political 
experience, age and size of state post-1972 are statistically insignificant. The insignificant 
effects of the two former variables mean that hypotheses H12 and H14 are not supported by 
the model: Presidential nominees have not been significantly more likely to include youth or 
political experience to the tickets. In contrast, the insignificant effect of size of state post-1972 
is in accordance with the expectations in hypothesis H17. It demonstrates that the positive 
effect of size of state is limited to the period before 1976. 
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Model 4’s percentage of correct predictions is also of an acceptably high level. 15 correctly 
predicted selection pool is better than models 1 and 3, yet one less than model 2. However, in 
terms of model fit, model 4 clearly outperforms the previous three models. Compared to 
model 3 (which had the best fit of the former models), the adjusted McFadden’s R2 has 
increased markedly, by .124. Also, the BIC has decreased by 8.6, which is characterized as 
strong evidence in favor of model 4. Nevertheless, the model can still be ameliorated: Of 
consideration of efficacy, parsimony and model specification, the variables that has 
insignificant effects should be removed.  
 
6.7.2 Model 5: Final synthesis model 
The new and final version of the synthesis model, labeled model 5, is thus constructed by 
excluding the following variables from model 4: Firstly, there is age and political experience. 
Secondly, size of state post-1972 is discarded. That variable has already demonstrated that the 
time-demarcation of the size of state variable is justified in model 4, but since keeping it in the 
model would lessen the overall model fit, it is excluded in model 5.  
 
To justify the removal of these three variables statistically, a likelihood ratio test of the two 
(nested) models 4 and 5 is conducted.  
 
Table 6.12 Likelihood ratio test of model 4 vs model 5 
Chi2 3.52 
Degrees of freedom 3 
Prob > chi2 .318 
* p<  .10 **.p< .05 ***.p< .01  
 
The test demonstrates that the three variables do not significantly improve of the model’s fit 
and that the exclusion of them will not be on the expense of the model’s explanatory power. 
Hence, they are confidently discarded in model 5, as tabulated below. 
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Table 6.13 Model 5: The final synthesis model 
Characteristics of potential 
ticket 
Logit 
coefficient 
Standard 
error 
P-value Odds ratio 
Current rival -2.88  .98  .023**  .05 
Ambition 1.33  .59  .025** 3.77 
Media exposure 
 .5  .23  .028** 1.64 
Size of state pre-1976 
 .84  .30  .005*** 2.33 
Demographic balance 1.57 1.26  .110 4.80 
Model Fit     
Chi2 (5) 30.65    
Prob > chi2        .000***    
Adjusted McFadden’s R2  .218    
BIC -8.58    
Percentage of correct predictions (15/27)  55.6 %    
 * p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01                 All significance tests are two-tailed 
N= 168 
 
 
 
In terms of variable effect, the model largely corresponds to model 4. The variables have 
statistically significant effects in the same directions, and their odds ratios are approximately 
of the same magnitude.  
 
The effect of the traditional variable current rival is negative and large. All other variables 
held constant, a finalist that rivaled the presidential nominee for the nomination would 
decrease his odds for selection by a factor of .05. Thus, the variable thoroughly refutes the 
premise of hypothesis H7. Instead of having the expected positive effect, rivalry for the 
presidential nomination in the current election cycle rather appears to minimize the electoral 
prospects of vice presidential finalists. In practice, this implies that even if Barack Obama had 
seriously considered Hillary Clinton as a running mate, her chances of being selected would 
probably have been slim: Her participation in the 2008 Democratic primaries would have 
decreased her chances by 96 %.  
 
Ambition, on the other hand, is compliant with the theory: It influences the selections 
positively, thus substantiating hypothesis H10. The odds ratio indicates that having been 
considered for the vice presidency or competed for the presidency in previous elections makes 
the selection odds increase by a factor of 3.96, all other variables held constant. Continuing 
with the example of Hillary Clinton, this means that her rivalry with Obama for the 
nomination in 2008 would enlarge her chances of being selected as vice president in the future. 
In fact, in the hypothetical scenario that a presidential nominee in 2012 would consider 
Clinton as running mate, her experiences in 2008 would increase her odds of being selected 
by nearly 300 %, all variables held equal.  
 78 
The effect of media exposure is also positive. The variable has an odds ratio of 1.94, which is 
only slightly below the odds ratio that was indicated in model 2. Again, to simplify the 
interpretation of the odds ratio, a unit increase on the variable is equaled to the difference 
between Sarah Palin and Joe Biden: If Palin had Biden’s level of media coverage in 2008, her 
odds for selection would nearly double, holding all other variables constant. Hypothesis H11 
is therefore again supported. Media exposure significantly increases a finalist’s vice 
presidential prospects.   
 
Size of state pre-1976 has a significant and positive effect. The odds ratio shows that a unit 
increase (again comparing a state with 3 electoral votes to a state with 8 votes) would more 
than double a finalist’s odds for selection, all other variables held constant. That substantiates 
the argument presented in hypothesis H17: The finalists hailing from large states would have 
a significant advantage in terms of being selected as running mate in the period between 1940 
and 1976.  
 
The only slight deviation from model 4 is the demographic balance variable. In model 4, it 
was statistically significant and had an odds ratio of over 6. In model 5, the p-value is only 
marginally above .10 and the odds ratio is 4.8. That is still a sizeable effect, though. If a 
finalist was of a different gender or racial background than the presidential nominee, holding 
all other variables constant, the odds of the candidate would increase by almost 400%. Thus, 
the H4 is still conditionally supported. Though balance of gender and ethnic background does 
not always count as positive assets for the vice presidential candidates, it seems that they are 
aspects that are consciously deliberated by the presidential nominee: If the selection pool 
contains demographically balancing finalists, the chances are that one of these finalists would 
be selected (like they did in both selection pools of 2008).  
  
Also, in terms of model fit, model 5 improves upon model 442. The likelihood ratio test is 
statistically significant, the adjusted McFadden’s R2 has increased and the BIC is reduced by 
over 4 units. This is indicative of positive evidence in favor of model 5. The percentage of 
correct predictions is however, unchanged at 15 correct predictions.  
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 The analysis of model 5 was repeated in a sixth model, where the not-so-significant demographic balance was 
excluded. However, this only caused a marginal improvement in model fit. The remaining variables’ effects 
direction, odds ratios and statistical significance remained fairly unchanged. Thus, the inclusion of a model 6, 
without demographic balance, in the thesis would have no influence on the conclusions. 
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Table 6.14 Correctly predicted cases in the final synthesis model 
Year Selection pool winner Correctly predicted 
1940 (D) Hull, Cordell X 
1944 (D) Truman, Harry  
1944 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1948 (D) Douglas, William O.  
1948 (R) Warren, Earl X 
1952 (D) Sparkman, John  
1952 (R) Nixon, Richard  
1960 (D) Johnson, Lyndon B. X 
1960 (R) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1964 (D) Humphrey, Hubert  
1964 (R) Miller, William X 
1968 (D) Rockefeller, Nelson X 
1968 (R) Finch, Robert X 
1972 (D) Kennedy, Edward X 
1976 (D) Mondale, Walter X 
1976 (R) Dole, Robert  
1980 (R) Ford, Gerald  
1984 (D) Ferraro, Geraldine  
1988 (D) Bentsen, Lloyd X 
1988 (R) Quayle, Dan X 
1992 (D) Gore, Al X 
1996 (R) Kemp, Jack  
2000 (D) Lieberman, Joe  
2000 (R) Cheney, Dick  
2004 (D) McCain, John X 
2008 (D) Biden, Joe  
2008 (R) Palin, Sarah X 
 Total 15 
 
The table shows that the predictive capacity of the model reaches its peak in the decade from 
1964 to 1976. Still, the model has correct predictions in all decades, thus a time-related trend 
in the prediction successes is not immediately apparent. Also, in comparison with the 16 
correct predictions of model 2, the success pattern is quite similar. Models 2 and 4 only 
deviates in three selection pools: Model 2 successfully predicted the Republican selections in 
1980 and 1996, whereas model 4 predicted the Republican selection of 1964 correctly.  
 
6.8 SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The final synthesis model is constructed with the objective of providing the best explanation 
for the vice presidential selections. To that end, it combines aspects of both the theory of 
increased complexity and the theory of changed dynamics, whilst the ticket-balancing theory 
is merely indirectly included as an integral element of the theory of increased complexity. 
Model 5 thus comprise the five variables that most consistently have had significant effects in 
the same directions in all the models. The robustness of the findings of model 5 is thus 
maximized. 
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Table 6.15 The findings of the final synthesis model: 
Actual effects 
 
Variable 
Expected 
effect Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Synthesis 
model(s) 
Implication for 
hypothesis 
H4 Demographic balance Positive 
Not 
significant Positive - Positive 
H4 is 
(conditionally) 
supported 
H7 Current rival Positive Not 
significant Negative - Negative 
H7 is 
Rejected 
H10 Ambition Positive - Positive - Positive H10 is supported 
H11 Media 
exposure Positive - Positive - Positive H11 is supported 
H17 Size of state pre-1976 Positive - - Positive Positive H17 is supported 
 
 
The table shows that the hypotheses H10, H11 and H17 are conclusively supported by the 
analyses. It seems that ambition and media exposure should be considered definite advantages 
for a finalist aiming for the slot as presidential running mate. Also, for the selections up to 
1976, the size of the finalists’ home states was of concern for the presidential nominees: The 
more electoral votes of the state, the better the finalist’s chances of being selected.  
 
With regards to H4, demographically balancing the ticket would too count as a benefit, but 
only on the occasions where the presidential nominee signals that he/she is open to such 
balance by including finalists of a different gender or ethnicity on the shortlist. Thus, the 
hypotheses are conditionally supported. Though it cannot be claimed that the variable has a 
uniformly positive effect (the effect can rather be described as occasionally positive), it seems 
that the finalists’ gender and race are aspects that are taken into consideration by the 
presidential nominee. 
 
Hypothesis H7 must, on the other hand, be rejected: Rather than having a positive effect, 
being a rival for the presidential nomination in the current election cycle would dramatically 
decrease the finalists’ chances of being selected (as indicated by the extreme size of the odds 
ratio’s negative factor change).   
 
Also, in a summary of the analysis’ findings, one should mention that there are mixed results 
for political experience and age, being statistically significant in model 2, but not in model 4. 
Secondly, the un-modified size of state variable has a positive effect in models 1 and 2, yet is 
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rejected when compared with the results of model 3, that indicates that the size of the 
finalist’s home states only matters before 1976. 
 
Finally, there are nine hypotheses than finds no support in the analyses, and thus can be 
discarded with some confidence. It seems that apart from the demographic balance variable, 
none of the balancing variables influence the selections, neither positively nor negatively. The 
same applies to the modern variables state competitiveness, education and military service. 
Also, political experience has no effect on the selection of vice presidents, neither for the 
entire period nor when tested separately in the periods before and after 1976/1972. However, 
though the regional balance pre-1976 and post-1972 had effects that also were insignificant, 
the hypothesis cannot be rejected with the same certainty because of the potential bias in the 
pre-1976 variable. 
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7 CONCLUSION 
The research conducted in this thesis confirms the basic premise shared by all three theories: 
There are observable systematic tendencies in the selection of vice presidential candidates 
from 1940 to 2008. The most evident mechanisms are the following:  
 
In general, presidential nominees pick running mates that enjoy extensive media coverage. 
Also, the presidential nominees tend to pick running mates that have been considered for the 
vice presidency or sought the presidency in earlier election cycles. However, if the finalists 
sought the presidential nomination in the current election cycle, thus rivaling the presidential 
nominee, they tend not to be selected. Furthermore, there is a discernable change over time in 
the selection dynamics. Presidential nominees tended to pick running mates from states that 
had many electoral votes in the period before 1976, but not after 1972. Finally, the running 
mates’ genders and ethnic backgrounds are factors that ate included in the decision calculus. 
Seemingly, certain presidential nominees want demographically balanced tickets, but the 
overall majority of them do not even consider the possibility of running with a politician of a 
different gender or race. 
 
Thus, the answer to the thesis’ research question is that ambition, media exposure, rivalry for 
the presidential nomination and , to some extent, demographic balance and size of state are 
the factors that best explains the vice presidential selections from 1940 to 2008. 
 
These findings have implications for the theoretical framework, for future research and for the 
empirical reality of vice presidential selections. This final chapter of the thesis discusses all of 
these aspects. 
 
7.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Gerald Pomper (1968: 129) wrote that "in a science of politics, disproving hypotheses is as 
important as their confirmation.” In that vein, the thesis offers a vital contribution to the 
literature. It rejects all the hypotheses derived from the conventional wisdom of presidential 
selections, leading to a conclusion that the ticket-balancing theory has little statistical value in 
explaining the historical selection dynamics. From 1940 to 2008, presidential nominees have 
generally not selected their running mates because they balanced the ticket in some way 
(albeit with the slight exception of demographic balance). Also, the effects of the vice 
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presidential home states and rivalry for the presidential nomination are not compliant with the 
expectations of the ticket-balancing theory. Thus, the analysis shows that the ticket-balancing 
theory can be considered outdated. It is certainly outranked by the two theories that 
represented modifications of the conventional wisdom.  
 
So why are the two other theories better at explaining vice presidential selections? Firstly, the 
theory of increased complexity introduces new selection criteria that have significant 
explanatory power (especially media exposure and political ambitions). Secondly, the theory 
of changed dynamics offers a valuable perspective on change over time in the selection 
process: There seems to have been different dynamics governing the selections before 1976 
and after 1972, at least in terms of the size of state variable. Both these “updated” theories 
hence offer valuable insights to the underlying mechanisms of vice presidential selection, 
more so than the ticket-balancing theory. Thus, this thesis suggests that the theoretical 
framework of the vice presidential selection would benefit from an amalgamation of these two 
perspectives.  
 
7.2 IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The synthesis model proposed in the thesis demonstrates substantial explanatory power for 
the vice presidential selections of 1940 to 2008, thus shedding some light on the selection 
dynamics. Still, there is much work left to do. Firstly, the perspective of temporal change 
should be further explored. The statistical analysis in this thesis was obviously affected by the 
(necessarily) small sample size and consequently low level of within-group variance, 
especially when it came to determining the effects of for example regional balancing before 
and after the watershed in 1972. Thus, the thesis’ analysis could arguably benefit from being 
supplemented by more in-depth studies of the vice presidential selections. Such studies would 
also be more sensitive to the differing electoral contexts than could a quantitative analysis.  
 
Also, the set of modern selection criteria can imaginably be expanded. For example; how has 
the greater use of opinion polls affected the selection? How about politicians that actively 
campaign for their selection to the office? What is the importance of the personal 
compatibility between the presidential nominee and his running mate? And, following 
Skowronek (2008)’s perspective on political time, do different categories of presidents choose 
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different types of running mates43? These are all aspects that could be researched further. And 
if the vice presidency continues to develop in the same direction and pace as it has done the 
last decades, the importance of this research will be even more urgent. One can no longer 
claim that the vice presidency is insignificant (or worth less than a pitcher of whatever 
content), any more than one can claim that the selection of the office’s occupants are 
irrelevant. 
 
7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL REALITY 
The vice president is essentially selected by one single (though popularly elected) person. 
Thus, the vice presidential selection process is at best indirectly democratic. That has been a 
cause for criticism of the office (Albert 2005; Goldstein 1977; Natoli 1980b, 1979). Yet, one 
can argue that the lack of democratic features of the selection process is only worrisome if it 
results in the wrong person getting the job. If presidential nominees selected their running 
mates based on their competence and ability to do the job, it would not be considered equally 
problematic (Nelson 1988: 484; Schlesinger 1974).  
 
From such a normative perspective, the results of the thesis’ analyses can be regarded as 
somewhat disappointing. First, the analyses find that political experience is not a key selection 
criterion. In none of the periods before 1976 or after 1972 (or in the entire period for that 
matter) did this variable influence the vice presidential selections significantly. Second, there 
is no robust evidence that presidential nominees tends to pick the candidates with the highest 
education44. Rather, the selections are dominated by characteristics that do not necessarily 
correlate with competence (i.e. finalists’ genders/ethnic backgrounds, their ability to get the 
media’s attention and the size of their home state). The only consolation in this respect must 
be the presidential nominees’ tendency of picking ambitious running mates. Though ambition 
is not synonymous with skill, one can at least hope that politicians that have previously sought 
the presidency or been considered as a potential vice president should have certain capabilities. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion of the thesis runs counter to the claim of Michael Nelson (1988: 
865) that the presidential nominees’ incentive for picking a competent running mate and 
desire to win the election have now converged. It still seems that ability to govern the country 
is not the main concern in the vice presidential selection. 
                                                 
43
 This idea was proposed and initially investigated by Julia Azari (2006). 
44
 Chapter six demonstrated that the education variable had a positive effect in model 2, but the effect was 
insignificant when the variable was retested in the synthesis model 4.  
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7.3.1 The selection of 2012 
As argued in chapter 3, explanation is built upon the same basic logic as prediction. The 
variables used for explaining the history of vice presidential selections will probably be 
pertinent in upcoming elections as well. So what implications do the thesis’ findings have for 
future selections of vice presidents? Admittedly, to engage in the “veepstakes” of 2012 
already in 2009 is perhaps to overreach. Yet, some vague speculations on the Republican 
choice of vice president can be posited45.  
 
The thesis’ synthesis model suggests that it would be a politician that had shown some 
political ambitions and have high media profiles. To find examples of potential candidates, 
one can therefore look to John McCain’s primary competitors for the presidential nomination 
in 2008. There is for instance Mike Huckabee and Mitt Romney. Quick searches in the 
archives of New York Times and Times Magazine show that they both enjoy extensive media 
coverage46. Thus, if neither of these candidates run for the 2012 presidency, they should both 
have decent chances for securing the vice presidential nod47. Still, this is inevitably closer to 
guesses than predictions. The fact that the identity of the presidential nominee is unknown 
makes it impossible to forecast anything with certainty. However, when the Republican 
presidential nominee is appointed in 2012 and there exists a shortlist of possible vice 
presidential candidates, one can certainly make more robust predictions based on the synthesis 
model.  
 
 
                                                 
45
 It is highly uncommon for a president to replace the running mate when seeking the second term (this has not 
happened since 1976). Thus, one can safely assume that Obama will most likely run again with Biden on the 
Democratic ticket in 2012.  
46
 For the period of January 1st to November 1st 2009, Huckabee was mentioned in 30 articles in the New York 
Times and 28 articles in the Times, whereas the respective number of articles for Romney was 50 and 28. 
47
 Given a white male Republican presidential candidate, some would even claim that Mitt Romney could 
balance the ticket demographically, since his father was born on Mexican soil (albeit in a Mormon colony, so it 
is perhaps a stretch of the concept of ethnicity) 
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9 APPENDIX 
9.1 OVERVIEW OF THE DELTA-BETA VALUES OF THE “CRITICAL CASES” 
The “critical cases” are the units of analysis that were only included in one of the datasets 
H&K and JB. The Delta-Beta statistic measures the difference in the coefficient vector that is 
caused by the deletion of a unit of observations. The higher the values, the more does the 
deletion of the unit of observation influence the result of the analysis. The table below shows 
that none of the “critical cases” have severely elevated Delta-Beta values in more than one of 
the three models.  
 
Table 8.1. Delta-Beta values of the “critical cases” 1960-2004*. 
Finalist Selection pool Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
Nelson Rockefeller 1964 (R) .006 .025 .000 
Joseph D. Alioto 1968 (D) .004 .023 .000 
Edward Kennedy 1968 (D) .084 .019 .000 
George H. W. Bush 1968 (R) .014 .007 .105 
Edward Muskie 1976 (D) .004 .014 .003 
Robert Dole 1988 (R) .003 .001 .002 
Mario Cuomo 1992 (D) .056 .881 .387 
Richard Gephardt 1992 (D) .002 .004 .002 
Jim Edgar 1996 (R) .002 .001 .002 
John McCain 1996 (R) .004 .001 .005 
Don Nickles 1996 (R) .001 .004 .003 
Tommy Thompson 1996 (R) .001 .006 .001 
Connie Mack 1996 (R) .004 .002 .007 
Jeanne Shaheen 2000 (D) .002 .013 .000 
Richard Gephardt 2000 (D) .055 .012 .004 
Bill Frist 2000 (R) .010 .002 .004 
George Pataki 2000 (R) .027 .759 .119 
Tom Ridge 2000 (R) .002 .004 .002 
Fred Thompson 2000 (R) .017 .001 .003 
Jeanne Shaheen 2004 (D) .004 .015 .013 
*Barring only Rockefeller in 1968(D), Ford 1980(R) and McCain in 2004(D), as these were coded as the 
winners of their respective selection pools, and could therefore not be removed from the dataset. 
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9.2 REPLICATIONS OF MODEL 3 
The independent variables political experience pre-1976 and political experience post-1972 
correlate highly, and thus might impose a problem of multicollinearity in model 3, which 
includes both variables. Below, model 3 is replicated twice, each time excluding one of these 
variables. The results remain fairly unchanged. 
 
Table 8.2 Model 3 without political experience pre-1976  
Characteristics of potential ticket Logit coefficient Standard error P-value Odds ratio 
Political experience post-1972 .54 .59 .361 1.71 
Size of state pre-1976 1.01 .38 .007*** 2.74 
Size of state post-1972 -.08 .17 .607 .92 
Regional balance pre-1976 1.8 1.64 .275 6.02 
Regional balance post-1972 .19 .86 .821 1.22 
Model Fit     
Chi2 (5) 18.59    
Prob > chi2 .002***    
* p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01 
N=168  
 
Table 8.3 Model 3 without political experience post-1972  
Characteristics of potential ticket Logit coefficient Standard error P-value Odds ratio 
Political experience pre-1976 -.32 .51 .529 1.72 
Size of state pre-1976 1.09 .43 .011** 2.97 
Size of state post-1972 -.10 .17 .541 .90 
Regional balance pre-1976 2.08 1.78 .243 8.01 
Regional balance post-1972 .28 .83 .740 1.32 
Model Fit     
Chi2 (5) 18.04    
Prob > chi2 .003***    
* p<  .10 **p< .05 *** p< .01 
N=168  
 
